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INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION

problem of
of
enduring fact of the global battle against HIV/AIDS is the problem
An enduring
providing access to anti-retroviral
anti-retroviral drugs ("ARVs") to all those who need them.
providing
and
protected by patent law, and
ARVs and other essential medicines are generally protected
developing world.44 A
they can be prohibitively expensive for persons in the developing
number
strategies have been employed
employed over time to increase
increase access to
to
number of strategies
essential medicines, including
including exclusion of pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical inventions from
essential
patent protection,
protection, enactment of curtailed
curtailed patent protection for drugs,
compulsory licensing, provision of medicines
medicines at discounted
imposition of compulsory
prices, and implementation of drug donation programs.
programs.55 One of the more
Agreement on Trade
Related
recent attempts has been the amendment of the Agreement
Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS") to allow countries
countries with
Aspects
manufacturing capacity (most likely middle-income
of
manufacturing
middle-income countries
countries with histories of
generic drug production
production such as Brazil and India) to manufacture
manufacture generic
generic
generic
countries lacking
patented drugs and export them at low prices to countries
versions of patented
lacking
the ability to manufacture.
manufacture.
compulsory licensing scheme created
created by this amendment (the
(the
In theory, the compulsory
"Health
Waiver" or "Waiver")
"Health Flexibility Waiver"
"Waiver") should provide an avenue for
increased access by allowing countries with the means and desire
desire to
increased
manufacture
served
manufacture to serve those countries whose public health needs are not served
by the default system of strong pharmaceutical
patent protection.
protection. 6 In practice,
practice,
pharmaceutical patent
however, the Health Flexibility Waiver is severely
severely underutilized,
underutilized, with only one
country signing on as an exporter of a generic
generic drug and one country signing on
on
as an importer of that drug as of the time of this writing.?
Commentators have
writing.7 Commentators

4' Although the access problem
problem is not limited to HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS and ARVs, the human impact
impact
(and the potential for improvement)
improvement) of the HIV crisis in the developing world has made
ARVs the most cited example in the access debate. This paper's focus on ARVs
ARVs reflects
their prominence in the public debate, but the hope is
is that the ideas developed herein may be
useful in improving access with respect to other therapies and other diseases as well.
5 See, e.g.,
e.g., DORIS ESTELLE LONG &
& ANTHONY D'AMATO,
D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
INTELLECTUAL
126
(West
Group
2000);
Merck,
PROPERTY
(West
Fighting
River Blindness,
22,
http://merck.comiresponsibility/access/access-feature-mectizan.html(last
http://merck.com/responsibi lity/access/access-feature-meetizan.html (last visited May 22,
2010).
66 See Press Release, World Trade Organization, Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle
at
at
to
Drug
Imports
(Aug.
2003),
30,
available
Cheap
http://www.wto.orgienglish/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm.
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm.
7 Canada has signed on as an exporting country, and Rwanda as an importing country.
7
to
The Canadian generics producer Apotex has been authorized to manufacture and export
export to
Rwanda 260,000 packs of TriAvir, a
a fixed-dose combination of the patented
patented ARVs
Zidovudine, Lamivudine, and Nevirapine. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects of
of
30
2(A) of the Decision of 30
Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under Paragraph 2(A)
August 2003
2003 on the Implementation
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Agreement
All (July 19,
Agreement and Public Health - Rwanda, IP/N/9/RW
IP/N/9/RWA/I
19, 2007), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GENhighLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+IP%F
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN _ highLightParenLasp?qu=%28+%40meta%5 FSymbol+IP%F
CN%FC9%FC%2A+%29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2F9
CN%FC9%FC%2A+%29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2F9
RWAI %2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=1P%2FN%2F9%2FRWA%2FI ; see also
RWAI%2EDOC%2EHTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=1P%2FN%2F9%2FRWA%2FI;
Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Notification Under
Under
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variously attributed
attributed this
this underutilization
underutilization to the
the scheme's
scheme's burdensomeness
burdensomeness and
and
variously
lack of implementation
implementation flexibility,
flexibility,S8 the
the scheme's
scheme's failure
failure to
to recognize
recognize the need
need
lack
economies of
of scale
scale for
for exporting
exporting countries,
countries,99 political
political pressure
pressure and norm
norm
for economies
0
West,IO failure of
of antitrust
antitrust and competition
competition policy,"
policy, II and
and
imposition by the
the West,'
inadequate existing market
market and
and private
private investment
investment models
models of
of development
development and
and
inadequate
12
distribution of
of public
public goodS.
goods.12
distribution
None of these
these rationales,
rationales, however,
however, paints aa complete
complete picture
picture of the
None
shortcomings of the Waiver. The real
real problem
problem is one of misaligned
misaligned incentives.
incentives.
shortcomings
Despite the short-term
short-term losses that
that aa compulsory
compulsory licensing
licensing scheme
scheme like the
Despite
Waiver creates
creates for drug company
company owners
owners of IP, there are
are sound
sound long-term
long-term
Waiver
consumers can
economic incentives
incentives for increasing
increasing access;
access; today's
today's ARV consumers
economic
become tomorrow's
tomorrow's Lipitor consumers
consumers only if they
they get cheap
cheap access
access to ARVs
ARV s
become
in the present. However,
However, the
the possibility
possibility of strategic
strategic behavior
behavior on the
the part
part of
of
developing nations
nations and third parties,
parties, particularly
particularly with
with regard
regard to diversion,
diversion, has
developing
instead given patent
patent owners
owners the incentive
undermine the Waiver by way of
of
incentive to undermine
Free Trade
Trade Agreements
As") and unilateral trade actions. Only by
("FTAs")
Agreements ("FT
realigning the incentives
incentives of all parties
parties can the Waiver be of any use in solving
realigning
the access problem.
of
Paragraph 2(C)
2(C) of the Decision of 30 August
August 2003
2003 on the Implementation
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
Paragraph
the Doha Declaration
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health - Canada,
IPINII OICAN/I
(Oct.
8.
2007),
available
http://docsonline.wto.org!
at
http://docsonline.wto.org/
8.
IP/N/10/CAN/1
GEN_highLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+IP%FCN%FCI0%FC%2A+%
GENhighLightParent.asp?qu=%28+%40meta%5FSymbol+IP%FCN%FCI0%FC%2A+%
29+&doc=D%3A
%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2F I OCAN I %2EDOC%2E
29+&doc=D%3A%2FDDFDOCUMENTS%2FT%2FIP%2FN%2FIOCANI%2EDOC%2E
HTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=IP%2FN%2F
I 0%2FCAN%2F I.
HTM&curdoc=3&popTitle=IP%2FN%2FI0%2FCAN%2Fl.
Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
'S See Amir Attaran,
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater Flexibility and a NonJusticiability Solution, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
Matthews, WTO
REv. 743 (2003); Duncan Matthews,
Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 66 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS
Problem?, 77
Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?,
Agreement
J.
ECON. L. 73, 97 (2004).
J. INT'L EcoN.
99 See Mike Gumbel, Comment, Is Article 31 bis Enough? The Need to Promote
TEMP. INT'L
Economies of Scale in the International Compulsory Licensing System, 22 TEMP.
INT'L &
COMPo
U. 161 (2008).
(2008).
COMP. L.J.
10
Socio-Cultural
A Consideration of Socio-Cultural
'0 See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A
Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U.
J.L. REFORM 433 (2006); James Thuo
U. MICH. J.L.
U.S. Foreign
Gathii, The Structural Power of Strong Pharmaceutical Patent Protection in u.s.
Policy,
(2003),
Policy, 77 J.
J.GENDER RACE & JUST. 267 (2003).
II
Uchi Ewelukwa, Patent Wars in the Valley of the Shadow of Death: The
" See, e.g.,
e.g., Uche
REv. 203 (2005).
Pharmaceutical Industry,
U. MIAMI L. REV.
Industry, Ethics, and Global Trade, 59 U.
12See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., Taiwo
Taiwo A.
A. Oriola,
Oriola, Strong
Strong Medicine:
Medicine: Patents, Market, and Policy Challenges
12
J.L. & TECH.
TECH.
for Managing Neglected Diseases and Affordable Prescription Drugs, 7 CAN. J.L.
57 (2009); Keith E.
& Jerome H. Reichman, The Globalization of Private
E. Maskus &
L. 279
1. INT'L ECON. L.
Global Public Goods, 77 J.
Knowledge Goods and the Privatization of Global
in
(2004); Jean O.
0. Lanjouw, Intellectual Property and the Availability of Pharmaceuticals in
B. Jaffe et al. eds.
INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY
(Adam 8.
Poor Countries, in 3 INNOVATION
ECONOMY 91 (Adam
to Enhance
Enhance
2003); James Love,
for the Developing World: Measures to
Love, Developing Drugs for
U.C.
R & D, 40 U.c.
Access to Medical Technologies,
Technologies, and New Methods of Stimulating Medical R&D,
DA
VIS L. REV.
DAVIS
REv. 679 (2007).
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realignment of the incentives under the Waiver
Waiver
The way forward may lie in realignment
regime by promoting
promoting co-op licensing treatment. A "co-op"
"co-op" compulsory
compulsory
regime
licensing approach, emphasizing
emphasizing shared investment,
investment, shared
shared work, and shared
participation in future benefits, may be the best hope for altering the costparticipation
benefit calculus of diversion for all parties involved. Such an approach would
benefit
would
provide short-term
short-term remuneration
remuneration for patent owners while
while guarding
guarding against
against
diversion and fostering development
development of local knowledge and industry.
The co-op
co-op license notion builds on Kevin Outterson's
Outterson's idea
idea that there is a
need to maximize
maximize adaptive
adaptive research
research and development
development to tailor medicines
originally introduced in high income countries
countries to local conditions, so that
medicines may be viable therapies
therapies in lower income countries.1313 Some
combination of local adaptive
adaptive R&D (or "local
"local innovation"), financial
participation in the upside of such local innovation,
innovation, and penalties
penalties for diversion
diversion
may reduce any locally-perceived
locally-perceived need to game the system and may lead to
to
improved short and long-term
long-term outcomes for all parties.
Part II
II of this Article explores the social and developmental
developmental underpinnings
underpinnings
of the access problem
problem and describes the legal framework that provides the
backdrop for the Waiver's licensing scheme. Part III examines the various
lenses,
economic, and political,
lenses, humanitarian, economic,
political, through which the
underutilization
underutilization problem may be viewed and explained.
explained. Part IV sets out the
structural heart of the Waiver scheme's deficiencies:
deficiencies: the notion of the
"compulsory" license itself.
itself. Part V posits a co-op scheme
"compulsory"
scheme of licensing that
aligns the concerns, goals, and incentives of IP owners, importers,
importers, exporters,
and consumers. Finally,
Finally, the Article relates
relates the proposed
proposed scheme to more
general trends in thinking
thinking regarding
regarding the deployment
deployment of intellectual property
assets.

1I.
II.
A.
A.

THE PROBLEM
PROBLEM

The Social
Social Landscape
Landscape

The basic social
social problem is simply stated: the world needs more ARVs and
and
other essential
essential medicines
medicines at reasonable
33
reasonable prices. Worldwide, an estimated 33
HIV/AIDS, including some 2.7 million people
people
million people are living with HIV/AIDS,
14
In the developed
developed world, the introduction of anti2007.14
newly infected in 2007.
retroviral therapies has improved the prospects
prospects for people living with the virus.
retroviral
HIV/AIDS has become
countries like the United
United States, HIV/AIDS
By some measures,
measures, in countries
By
a disease
disease that can be managed
managed and lived with, rather than the sure and quick
quick
13 Creation
of heat-stable
formulations, shelf-stable
shelf-stable formulations, and fixed-dose
13
Creation of
heat-stable formulations,
the
of such adaptive research. See Kevin
combinations
would
be
examples
Kevin
examples
of
fruits
combinations
31
Outterson, Disease-Based Limitations on Compulsory Licenses Under Articles 31 and 31
Outterson,
bisl6 (Boston
09-26, 2009), available
available at
bis/6
(Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 09-26,
at
http://www.bu.edullaw/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/OuttersonK052009.p
http://www.bu.edu/law/faculty/scholarship/workingpapers/documents/OuttersonKO52009.p
df.
df.
14 UNAIDS,
UNAIDS,
2008 REPORT ON THE GLOBAL AIDS
14
200S
EPIDEMIC
16 (200S),
AIDS EPIDEMIC
16
(2008),
http://www.unaids.orglenlKnowledgeCentre/HIVDatalG lobal Reportl200S/200S_ G loba I_rep
http://www.unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/HIVData/GlobalReport/2008/2008_Global
rep
ort.asp.
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death sentence
By contrast, in developing countries where
sentence it was in the past. By
ARVs are not widely available,
available, people who contract the disease simply die. A
disproportionate
people that die from HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS
disproportionate number of the three million people
annually live in low-access regions such as sub-Saharan Africa (where some
22 million people
people have HIV) and Southeast
Southeast Asia (where the infection
infection rate is
is
estimated at 2%).'
2%).15
The terminal nature of the disease when untreated has a particularly
particularly jarring
impact on societies
societies with very high infection rates. For example,
example, in Botswana,
where the adult HIV/AIDS
infection rate has been estimated
the
HIV/AIDS infection
estimated at 37%, the
1.76
disease has produced in excess of 120,000 orphans in a total population
population of 1.76
decreased by four
expectancy is estimated to have decreased
million.1166 In Cambodia,
Cambodia, life expectancy
million.
years due to HIV/AIDS.17
mortality rates are bound to
to
HIV/AIDS.' 7 Such high infection and mortality
have an impact
impact on family structure, social stability, and economic
economic
development.

B.
B.

The Role of
oj Development

According
market for
participants in the global market
According to commentators
commentators and partIcIpants
essential medicines, development
once a cause
cause of the access problem,
problem, a
development is all at once
partial solution to the problem, and the ultimate prize for finding a solution.
development limits access, increased development
development improves access,
Lack of development
should
and solving public health crises and improving public health outcomes should
long-term economic development.
lead to long-term
One of the major obstacles
access is price. The countries where
obstacles to ARV access
GDP countries. Market
AIDS/HIV
Market prices
AIDS/HIV is most devastating tend to be low GOP
for some therapies exceed
exceed US$IO,OOO
year.' 8 For some
US$10,000 per patient per year.IS
developing
healthcare provider
developing countries where the government is the major healthcare
for the populace, the aggregate
market cost of providing ARVs for all who
who
aggregate market
represent a multiple
multiple of the total national
national health budget. One
need them would represent
200
estimate put the theoretical
theoretical price tag for South Africa to supply its
2001I estimate
infected population with market-rate ARVs at US$24-42 billion - one hundred
infected
19
time.19
times South
South Africa's national public health budget at the time.

See id.
id. at
39, 48.
at 39,
Botswana
has actually
experienced improved
Botswana has
actually experienced
improved access to ARVs in the last few years
of
impact produced by years of
relative to its neighbors, but this data gives an idea of the social impact
HIV/AIDS AND
AND
UNAIDS/WHO, EPIDEMIOLOGICAL FACT SHEETS ON HIV/AIDS
low access. See UNAIDS/WHO,
SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS: BOTSWANA
BOTSWANA 3, 7 (2006), http://apps.who.int/
http://apps.who.int/
SEXUALLY
globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2006/EFS
_PDFs/EFS2006 _ BW. pdf.
globalatlas/predefinedReports/EFS2006/EFSPDFs/EFS2006_BW.pdf.
17 Jacqueline
Jacqueline Debarats,
U.N. Dep't of Econ. &
& Soc. Affairs, Population Div. Workshop
17
Debarats, U.N.
Workshop
on HIV/AIDS and Adult Mortality in Developing
Developing Countries, Adult Mortality in the Era
of
Era of
HI
VIA IDS: Asia 6, U.N.
UN/POP/MORT/2003/5 (Aug. 14,
available at
14, 2003), available
U.N. Doc. UN/POP/MORT/2003/5
HIV/AIDS:
http://www
.un.org/esa/population/publ ications/adu ItmortlD ES BARATS Rev2 _ Paper5.
pdf.
Paper5.pdf.
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/adultmort/DESBARATSRev2
18
AIDS, Drug Prices and Generic Drugs, http://www.avert.org/
http://www.avert.org/
" See AVERT, AIDS,
Universal Antiretroviral
generic.htm;
Barriers to Universal
Antiretro viral
generic.htm; Mary Beth Walker, Assessing the Barriers
195
Comp. &
Int'l L.
HIVIAlDS in South Africa,
Africa, 15 Duke J.
J. Compo
& In!'1
L. 193, 195
Treatment
Treatment Access for HIV/AIDS
(2004).
19
theoretical price tag is arrived at by mUltiplying
estimated infected South
South
multiplying the estimated
'9 This theoretical
IS
"

16
16
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Price is not the only problem. As patent owners and their aIlies
allies are wont to
non-price
least-developed countries
countries experience
experience many non-price
point out, developing
developing and least-developed
related challenges in providing essential
essential medications. Developing
Developing countries
countries
necessary public health infrastructure
infrastructure for transporting and
may lack
lack the necessary
and
distributing certain
certain drugs. Clinics and clinicians
prescribing,
distributing
clinicians for diagnosing, prescribing,
and administering
administering medicines
medicines may be in short supply. If products require
special handling, like refrigeration,
refrigeration, the odds are against
against infected
infected people in rural
or otherwise
otherwise isolated communities being able to use them.
Another potential
potential non-price access obstacle
obstacle is corruption. When the
governments or pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical companies of rich countries
countries create programs
developing countries, there is a
that give grants, discounts, or free medicines to developing
risk that the program will end up lining the pockets
pockets of a public health official,
government minister. Shipments of discounted
discounted drugs
president, or some other government
black
can disappear from the supply chain and end up being sold on the black
market, not necessarily to the neediest patients. Control over drug aid may
even be used as a weapon
weapon by one political,
political, ethnic,
ethnic, or religious faction against
another, reinforcing existing divisions rather than alleviating the public health
crisis for all.
Compounding
challenges of getting medicines
Compounding the logistical and political challenges
medicines
into the right hands are the educational
educational and social barriers facing people
people
seeking
treatment in the first place. Local ignorance
ignorance of a disease and the
seeking treatment
therapies for treating
treating it, or local rejection of diagnosis
diagnosis of the disease and its
therapies
access regardless of price. For example,
example, in
treatment, can result in suboptimal access
South Africa, then-president
then-president Thabo Mbeki
Mbeki infamously denied the causal link
South
between the HIV virus and AIDS,
effectiveness of the
AIDS, created doubt about the effectiveness
between
HIV/AIDS approach as racists.22o0 Even the
drug AZT, and derided critics of his HIV/AIDS
simple act of wearing a condom, which is cheap and readily available in most
countries, is fraught with so much cultural baggage that its role in disease
countries,
2
'
HIV/AIDS
HIV/AIDS prevention has had to be actively and expensively advocated. 21
development and access is not limited to the
The nexus between
between economic development
the
ET AL., MED.
African population and the estimated cost of treatment. See ROB DORRINGTON ET
African
RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COUNCIL, THE IMPACT OF HIV/AIDS
AFRICA 7
HIV/AIDS ON ADULT
ADULT MORTALITY
MORTALITY IN
IN SOUTH AFRICA
(200 I), http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod/complete.pdf
(estimates 4.2 million infected South
(2001),
http://www.mrc.ac.za/bod/complete.pdf (estimates
IDS, FACT SHEET, ACCESS TO HIV TREATMENT
TREATMENT AND CARE (2003),
Africans in 2001); UNA
(2003),
Africans
UNAIDS,
of
treatment en.pdf
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/Fact-Sheets04/fs_treatment_
en. pdf (estimates the cost of
http://data.unaids.org/Publications/Fact-Sheets04/fs
highly active anti-retroviral therapy for one patient
patient for a year to be $10,000
$ 10,000 to SS12,000).
12,000).
highly
annual health budget
budget is estimated
The annual
estimated for purposes of this comparison at just under S I
Gauteng MEC for Health, Budget Vote Speech 2001/2002
2001/2002
billion. See Gwen Ramokgopa, Gauteng
1 0 105 3 124 5 0
pl ol.htm
/
(May 31,
31, 200
I), available at http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/200
http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/010531245pI00I.htm
(May
2001),
("It gives me great pleasure
pleasure to present to the House
House today and to the Gauteng public, the
the
Our budget
budget for this year is R6.7 billion [or
Health Budget for the 2001/2002
2001/2002 financial year. Our
[or
US$916 million].").
USS916
20 See
See Mary
Mary Beth
Beth Walker,
Note, Assessing
Assessing the Barriers
Antiretroviral
20
Walker, Note,
Barriers to Universal Antiretroviral
193, 195-96
195-96
15 DUKE J.
J. COMP.
COMPo & INT'L L.
L. 193,
Treatment Access for HIVIAIDS in South Africa, 15
(2004).
(2004).
21 See
See Monica
India Fights to Promote Condoms, BBC NEWS,
NEws, July 15, 2003,
21
Monica Chadha,
Chadha, India
2003,
http://news.bbc.co.ukl2/hi/south_asia/3067325.stm.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south-asia/3067325.stm.
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economic development
development necessitate
necessitate more
more access
access (i.e.,
(i.e.,
theory that
that low
low levels
levels of economic
minimum
level
of
development,
questions
less
IP
protection).
Without
some
of development, questions
less
protection). Without some minimum
of strong
strong versus
versus weak
weak IP protection,
protection, or
or high
high versus
versus low access,
access, are moot
moot
inquiries.
According
to
one
commentator,
before
adopting
strong
IP
(and
low
(and low
strong
inquiries. According to one commentator, before
access) policies,
policies, least developed
developed countries
countries must
must reach a development
development threshold
threshold
that includes
includes a GNP significantly
significantly above
above subsistence
subsistence level,
level, a significant
significant level of
of
and
engineers,
and
technical
sophistication
among
the
country's
scientists
and
engineers,
a
scientists
technical sophistication among the
22
22
certain
level
of
internal
investment
capita1.
certain level of internal investment capital.
the other hand,
hand, a relaxation
relaxation of IP protections
protections for some
some period
period provides
On the
benefits that promote
promote aa developing
developing country's
country's economic
economic growth.
growth. Domestic
Domestic
benefits
consumers experience
experience increased
increased welfare
welfare and are better
better off because
because of
of the
the
consumers
availability
of
lower
priced
versions
of
the
IP
asset.
Availability
of
the
IP
asset
asset
Availability of
the
priced versions
availability
contributes to enhancement
enhancement of infrastructure
infrastructure and
and human
human welfare
welfare within the
the
contributes
asset's specific
specific field or industry. The country's
country's foreign exchange
exchange picture
of, royalty payments
improves because of the lack of,
of, or relatively
relatively low value of,
and repatriation
repatriation of profits
profits by
by the multinational
multinational owner of the IP. Domestic
Domestic
the
based
expertise
entrepreneurs
are
able
to
develop
enterprises
and
expertise
on
the IP
IP
enterprises and
entrepreneurs
asset. And the "imitated
"imitated products"
products" may open up new export
export markets
markets for the
23
developing country.
country.23
developing
Without some differentiation
differentiation with
with regard to how markets
markets for a patented drug
Without
nor the patent system is served. With thoughtful
are treated,
treated, neither access
access nor
differentiation, access may serve as a bridge to further economic
economic development
development
differentiation,
and optimal deployment of patented
patented medicines. 24 The
The India example is
of
instructive
India, which before 2003 provided
provided a lower
lower tier
tier of
instructive in this regard. India,
protection
for
pharmaceutical
inventions
than
for
inventions
in
other
fields,
protection
pharmaceutical
saw enormous growth
growth in the value of pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical products produced
produced and
exported
between
1965
and
2001.25
domestic
production
provides
provides
production
Today,
2001.25
exported between
materials
raw
approximately
70%
of
the
for
pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical
needs
country's
approximately
26 If the
and some 80% of its needs for finished pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical products. 26
IP
policyby
connection
between
and
development
can
be
exploited
exploited
development
access
connection between
makers, then it is possible
possible for the type of technology
technology transfer, investment, and
and
welfare enhancement
turn today's access seeker into
enhancement to occur that will tum
27 Such future
tomorrow's producer and exporter of essential
essential medicines.27
tomorrow's
producers will then be more receptive
strong IP and will set the stage for
receptive to strong
28
even greater
greater domestic economic
economic growth. 28
22See
See
22

Dru Brenner-Beck,
Brenner-Beck, Do
Do as
as II Say.
Say, Not
Not as
as I Did,
Did, II
11 UCLA
UCLA PAC.
BASIN L.J. 84,
84, 84
Oru
PAC. BASIN
(1992).
(1992).
23 Id.
Id. at 100.
23
100.
24
See generally
generally Lanjouw,
24 See
Lanjouw, supra note 12.
12.
25 Samira
Samira Guennif
Guennif &
& Julien
Julien Chaisse,
Chaisse, Present
Present Stakes Around Patent
Patent Political
Political Economy:
Economy:
25
J.
ASIAN J.
Legal and Economic Lessons From the Pharmaceutical Patent Rights in India, 2 ASIAN
WTO &
HEALTH L. &
65, 72 (2007).
& POL'y
POL'Y 65,
& INT'L HEALTH
26 Id
26
Id.
27 See
See generally
generally Maskus
Maskus &
& Reichman, supra
note 12.
27
supra note
12.
21 Reaching
Reaching the
the level
level of
of development
development of
of the
the richest countries isis still associated with
with a
28
strong IP regime, despite the benefits of
of a low IP regime at lower levels of development.
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Legal Landscape
The Legal

the non-price
non-price factors described
described above
above are cited
cited as
as significant
significant
Although the
access to
to medicines,
medicines, the
the fact
fact remains
remains that the
the debate
debate is,
is, for the
the
obstacles to access
by price. The
The high
high price
price of
of ARVs
ARVs and other
other essential
most part, defined by
medicines is due in part to the
the fact that these therapies
therapies are covered
covered by patents
medicines
which the patent
patent owners
owners typically
typically seek strong protection
protection all over the world.
for which
Patents confer
confer upon their owners
owners a monopolist
monopolist position with regard
regard to the
the
Patents
patented invention.
invention. In the
the United States, for example,
example, a patent
patent owner has the
the
patented
right to exclude
exclude others
others from making, using, selling, offering
offering for sale,
sale, or
or
right
importing the invention. 29 The national
national laws of any signatory
signatory to the
the
importing
Agreement on
on Trade Related Aspects
Aspects of Intellectual
Intellectual Property
Property ("TRIPS")
("TRIPS") must
Agreement
include analogous
protections, and such
such laws
laws may not discriminate
discriminate by field of
of
analogous protections,
include
3o So, a TRIPS signatory
invention.30
signatory must, in theory,
theory, grant aa monopoly to the
the
including an invention in the pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical
owner of any patented invention, including
field.331'
Of course,
course, a monopolist will tend to provide fewer goods at higher
higher prices
prices
Of
monopoly
than a firm facing competition.
competition. Any
Any policies
policies in favor of more monopoly
control for pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical companies
companies will then necessarily
necessarily create access
problems relative
relative to policies that introduce low-priced
low-priced competitive
competitive products.
products.
For their part, patent owners argue that without
without strong patent protection, future
expenditures will be greatly reduced, and long-term
outcomes will suffer
suffer
long-term outcomes
R&D expenditures
32 The pharmaceutical
purported short-term
access. 32
pharmaceutical
short-term gain in access.
for the sake of a purported
holder maintains
maintains that society gains
gains more by strengthening
strengthening the patent
patent holder
33
inventions. 33
holder's hand than by reducing its control over its inventions.
Before 1994, countries
countries with access
access or other public health issues connected
connected
34 The territoriality
with patented
patented medicines dealt with them in their own ways.
ways.34
of patents and the relative weakness of existing international
international agreements
agreements
in
regarding intellectual property left each jurisdiction to its own devices in
Some countries refused to recognize patents
patents for
solving access problems. Some
provided weaker
weaker patent protection
protection for drugs
drugs at all. Some, like India, provided
legally allowed to
manufacturers were legally
than for other inventions. Local manufacturers
recreate another's chemical
chemical compound
compound in a generic version of the drug, so long
long
recreate
generic manufacturer
manufacturer's process
manufacturer did not copy the branded manufacturer's
as the generic

product
For a discussion of the theoretical link between strong trademark protection and product
Challenges for
E. Maskus, Intellectual Property Challenges
launches and development, see Keith E.
(2001).
L. REV.
REv. 457, 461 (2001).
U. ILL. L.
Developing Countries: An Economic Perspective, 2001 U.ILL.
29 35 U.S.c.
(a) (2006).
29
U.S.C. §§ 271
27 1(a)
30See
Agreement on
on Trade
Related Aspects
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, 33
33
30
See Agreement
Trade Related
I.L.M.
81
(1994).
(1994).
1.L.M.
31
31

Id.
Id.

n See generally PhRMA, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT,
REPORT, http://www.phrrna.orglnode/38
http://www.phrma.org/node/38 (last
I 0).
visited
visited Mar. 22, 20
2010).
32

33
33 Id.
Id.

34 See DORIS ESTELLE LONG &
& ANTHONY
ANTHONY D'AMATO, INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
INTELLECTUAL
34
PROPERTY 126 (West Group 2000).
2000).
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35 Other nations, like Brazil, loudly proclaimed
creating the drug.35
right
proclaimed their right
for creating
licenses for patented
patented drugs, especially
especially where the owner
owner
to impose compulsory
compulsory licenses
of the drug had opted not to produce
produce the drug locally for domestic supply. A
compulsory
license would be awarded to a local manufacturer, and a
compulsory license
reasonable royalty, set by the government,
government, would be remitted to the patent
patent
reasonable
36
owner.36
TRIPS, negotiated
negotiated as part of the Uruguay Round of trade talks that led to the
TRIPS,
creation
Organization (the "WTO"),
severely
"WTO"), has severely
creation of the World Trade Organization
weakened the ability of national governments
governments to develop their own solutions to
weakened
concomitant ability to
the access problem. Admission into the WTO, and the concomitant
advantage of favorable
favorable trade treatment by the 138 other members, was
take advantage
conditioned on also acceding to TRIPS.J7
requirement created potential
TRIPS. 37 This requirement
conditioned
of
problem-solvers. Article 27 of
problems for some of the most active access problem-solvers.
TRIPS did away with the practice of discriminating
discriminating against patented inventions
based on field of technology, and thus limited the ability of countries to deny
38 Article
protection
pharmaceutical inventions.
inventions. 38
protection to pharmaceutical
Article 30 limited any exceptions to
"do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
patent rights to those that "do
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably
legitimate
unreasonably prejudice
prejudice the legitimate
exploitation
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
parties."39
weakened compulsory licensing as an access tool by,
parties."39 Article 31 weakened
among other things, requiring negotiations
negotiations with the patent holder before
issuing a compulsory license, limiting the scope and duration
duration of uses under
compulsory license, and limiting compulsory licensing to use in supplying
supplying the
40
domestic (non-export)
(non-export) market. 4o
Although TRIPS allowed
allowed compulsory licensing
licensing to be used to address issues
of public health, signatories
signatories were
were confused
confused as to under what circumstances
circumstances
they would be justified
justified in issuing such licenses. In 2001,
Africa's
2001, South Africa's
attempt to grant its Health Minister the power to issue compulsory
compulsory licenses,
medicines in order to
weaken patent protection,
paraJlel imports of medicines
protection, and allow parallel
protect public
public health was challenged
the
challenged by the local affiliate of the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
Manufacturers Association, the pharmaceutical
main
pharmaceutical industry's main
trade group.41
June of that year, the United
United States commenced
commenced WTO dispute
group.4 1 In June
settlement proceedings
Brazil for its attempt to grant compulsory
proceedings against Brazil

3 For aa detailed treatment of the history of pharmaceutical
35
pharmaceutical patent protection in India, see
Guennif &
supra note 25,
25, at 68-73.
& Chaisse, supra
36 For
of Brazil's
history of
of compulsory licensing in
36
For aa detailed
detailed treatment
treatment of
Brazil's history
of use of
in
Guimaries &
expanding access, see Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques, Valeska Santos Guimaraes
&
Drugs, Breaking Patents,
Patents, and
Caitlin Sternberg, Brazil's
AntiretroviralDrugs,
Brazil's AiDS
AIDS Controversy:
Controversy: Antiretroviral
FOOD & DRUG
DRUG L.J. 471,473-76
(2005).
Compulsory
Licensing, 60 FOOD
471, 473-76 (2005).
Compulsory Licensing,
3 See HOLGER
37
HOLGER HESTERMEYER,
HESTERMEYER, HUMAN RIGHTS
RIGHTS AND THE WTO: THE
THE CASE
CASE OF PATENTS
2007).
AND ACCESS
ACCESS TO MEDICINES
MEDICINES xxxiv (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
31 See Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 27, 33
38
33
I.L.M.
(1994).
1.L.M. 81 (1994).
3 Id.
39
Id. at art. 30.
40
41
41

See id.
3 I.
id. at art. 31.
See Matthews, supra note 8,
8, at 78-79.
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locally. 42
manufactured locally.42
licenses where a patented
patented product
product was not manufactured
Finally, in November
November 2001,
after negotiations at Doha, Qatar, the WTO
2001, after
of
affirmed the right of nations to prioritize access to medicines over protection
protection of
parties"
IP rights, and supported
"legitimate interests
interests of third parties"
supported use of the "legitimate
Article 30 as a basis for allowing compulsory
compulsory licensing of patented
patented
language of Article
drugs. The "Doha
"Doha Declaration"
Declaration" also extended the deadline
deadline for the least43 What the
2016.43
developed WTO members to become TRIPS-compliant until 2016.
Declaration did not definitively
definitively do, however, was address the ability of a
Declaration
country to produce generic versions
versions of patented
patented medicines
medicines for export to
countries that need the drug but lack manufacturing
manufacturing capacity. In 2003, the
the
WTO ostensibly cured that failing by issuing its Decision on Implementation
Implementation
44 The decision, which this author has
of Paragraph
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration.
Declaration.44
called the Health
Health Flexibility Waiver, temporarily
temporarily allowed countries to trade in
December 2005, the
medicines manufactured
under compulsory license. In December
manufactured under
the
permanent by amending
amending the TRIPS
WTO made the Health Flexibility Waiver permanent
agreement. 45
III.
CURRENT LANDSCAPE
LANDSCAPE
Ill. DISPARATE
DISPARATE VIEWS OF THE CURRENT
Compounding the complexity
the
complexity of seeking an access solution, given the
difficult social,
social, economic, and legal terrain to be navigated,
navigated, the view of the
the
difficult
terrain is not necessarily shared by all. This Section
Section discusses the various and
and
terrain
disparate lenses through which observers of the access situation
situation perceive the
the
disparate
problem.

A.

Humanitarian Lens
The Humanitarian

Viewed through a humanitarian
life-saving therapies,
humanitarian lens, access to life-saving
including ARVs, is arguably
arguably a key element of the fundamental human right of
of
of
enjoyment by everyone
everyone in the world of the "highest attainable standard
standard of
enjoyment
physical and mental health."46
Commissioner for
health." 46 The Office of the High Commissioner
Human Rights has expressed
expressed the need to move beyond a purely commercial
view of treatment of disease and embrace an approach that creates incentives
incentives

See id.
id. at 80.
43
Organization, Ministerial Declaration
Declaration of 14 November
November 2001,
2001, ~~
4 See World Trade Organization,
%f4-6,
755-56 (2002).
755, 755-56
(2002).
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2,
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755,
4 See Decision
44
Decision of the General Council, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Doha
(Aug. 30, 2003)
Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Aug.
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement
[hereinafter
[hereinafter Doha Declaration].
45
Decision of the General
WT/L/641I
Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/64
General Council, Amendment
'5 See Decision
(Dec.
Amendment by two-thirds of WTO members was
(Dec. 6, 2005). The time set to ratify the Amendment
I, 2007,
2007, but has since been extended until Dec. 31,
Dec. 1,
31, 2009. At the time of this article,
the Amendment
Amendment has not yet been ratified.
46
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
G.A. Res. 2200
46 International
Intemational Covenant on Economic,
of
Declaration of
A/63 16 (Dec.
(Dec. 16, (966).
1966). See also Universal Declaration
(XXI),
12, U.N.
U.N. Doc. A/6316
(XXI), at 51,
51, art. 12,
Human Rights, G.A.
G.A. Res. 217A,
217A, at 76, U.N.
U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Sess., 1st
mtg., U.N.
Ist plen. mtg.,
U.N. Doc.
Human
Al810
(Dec. 12,
1948) (setting
(setting forth a standard
standard of living adequate
adequate for health
health and well-being
well-being
12, 1948)
A/810 (Dec.
of the family as a fundamental
fundamental human right).
42
42
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to broaden access to medicines and fosters research into "unprofitable"
"unprofitable"
47
neglected diseases. 47
The pure humanitarian perspective
perspective would tend to push states and
supranational
supranational institutions toward non-market or extra-market
extra-market solutions that
limit the control that the owners
owners of the drugs exercise
exercise over price and supply,
governments. For
and perhaps
perhaps to shift more of that control to national governments.
"social lien" on
example, Professor
Professor Taiwo
Taiwo Oriola has advocated
advocated placing a "social
medicines developed from publicly
publicly funded research. Such a lien would create
a moral obligation
obligation on the part of the patent owner
owner to facilitate
facilitate access to the
patented drug. 48 Arguments
Arguments regarding
regarding development
development costs and protecting
incentives to innovate hold little sway
incentives
sway over proponents
proponents of this view, in part
because
because research
research costs are so often subsidized
subsidized by the state, and in part because
advertising, are argued to add
non-research
non-research costs, such as marketing and advertising,
significantly
claimed by patent owners in justifying
significantly to the total "overhead"
"overhead" claimed
49
high drug prices.
prices. 49
Given a choice between
between protecting human life and protecting
protecting patent rights,
proponents of this approach would nearly always choose
choose expanding
expanding access to
proponents
support human life and health. Arguments
Arguments about the cost of drug development
development
are unavailing, and greed or misplaced
misplaced priorities provide a too easy
of
explanation
owners to strong implementation
implementation of
explanation for the resistance of patent owners
rights-based access
access initiatives.
human rights-based

B.

The Market
Market Fundamentalist
Fundamentalist Lens

fundamentalism,
If the access problem is viewed through the lens of market fundamentalism,
the set of possible
possible solutions looks very different. Under this view,
view, the only
way to persuade
persuade inventors of medicines
medicines to spend
spend their time inventing
inventing is to
reward them with a period
period of exclusivity/monopoly
exclusivity/monopoly over the production
production and
distribution of their invention. Upon expiration of the exclusivity
exclusivity period, the
invention
invention enters the public domain
domain and society as a whole is enriched.
Research and development is a costly endeavor
endeavor with uncertain outcomes,
outcomes, and
no rational actor would engage in such activity if it could not exert
exert control
control over
product later on. Free riders kill the incentive to innovate, and
and
the resulting product
only by reducing
reducing or eliminating
eliminating the rents captured
captured by free riders will we allow
allow
creators
enterprise to flourish.50
50 Encouraging
Encouraging strong patent rights
creators and creative
creative enterprise

47
Office of the High Comm'r for Human Rights, Submission
Ministerial
47 Office
Submission to the 5th WTO Ministerial
Conference
Cancun, Mexico,
Conference Cancun,
Mexico, JO-14
10-14 September
September 2003: Human Rights and
and Trade,
Trade, at 7-8 (Sept.
2003),
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/englishlissues/globalization/trade/
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/globalization/trade/
available
docs/5WTOMinisteriaICancun.pdf.
docs/5WTOMinisterialCancun.pdf
48 Oriola,
supra note 12, at 78.
48
Oriola, supra
49 Jd.
Id at 59-61,
59-61, 90-92.
90-92. See also Gail E.
E. Evans, Strategic
Strategic Patent
Patent Licensing for
Public
49
for Public
Clauses to Promote
Deploying Restriction
and Reservation
Reservation Clauses
Research Organizations:
Restriction and
Promote
Research
Organizations: Deploying
"declining
175, 194 (citing "declining
Medical
Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 175,
Medical R&D in Developing Countries,
commercialization, increasing
R&D productivity, rising costs of commercialization,
increasing payor
payor influence, and
and
shorter exclusivity
exclusivity periods"
periods" as factors in the increasing cost to launch a new drug product).
50 See Thomas F. Cotter, Market
Fundamentalism and the TRIPS Agreement, 22
50
Market Fundamentalism
22
CARDOZO
& ENT.
ENT. L.J. 307, 323-24 (2004).
(2004).
CARDOZO ARTS &
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across the globe, even in developing
developing countries, supports the protection of
of
encouragement eliminates
innovators against free riders because such encouragement
eliminates the
the
collective action problem that might lead individual countries
weaken their
their
countries to weaken
patent laws for short term advantage. 551' Allowing
Allowing any opportunities to opt out
of strong patent protection under TRIPS would lead to fewer patented
patented
inventions overall.
Complicating
Complicating the research incentives
incentives question is the fact that, under the
current pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical research
research paradigm, most drug development
development is financed
by large, publicly traded companies; and such companies
companies are,
are, for the most
most part,
part,
the owners of the patents at issue in the access debate. As for-profit
enterprises, they cannot ignore the impact
enterprises,
impact of access decisions
decisions on revenues and
and
profits, at least not if they expect
expect to continue in business
business for the long term. As
corporations,
constrained by the fiduciary duties of their
their
corporations, they are further constrained
52 So, although
managers to make decisions that benefit their shareholders.52
maximization and access,
there may be room to balance profit maximization
access, and although the
owners may desire to implement
managers, officers, and directors of patent owners
implement
access solutions, there will always be a structural
structural drag on their ability to do so.
When the problem is viewed through this lens, solutions should err on the
side of protecting the rights of patent owners. Alan Sykes has advocated
advocated
limiting compulsory
occurrence of a
compulsory licensing by narrowly construing
construing the occurrence
"national emergency"
emergency" under TRIPS, by encouraging
"national
encouraging lengthy
lengthy negotiations over
over
licensing
arrangements,
and
by
licensing arrangements,
tying the "adequate
"adequate remuneration"
remuneration" concept of
of
TRIPS Article 31 to actual R&D costs incurred by the patent holder
holder (for both
successful and unsuccessful
unsuccessful research
directed at the same disease).53
all,
successful
research directed
disease).5 After all,
only if the patent owner receives the right incentives to develop drugs in the
short term will it continue to devote resources
resources to R&D in the future; and only
54
then will we have more life-saving
life-saving drugs in the long term. 54
The patent owners are benefiting
benefiting the public in the long run via continued
continued
introduction to the market of new technology, and restrictions of patent rights
carry the risk of diminishing
diminishing the value of such technology, maybe even to zero.
Therefore,
Therefore, derogations
derogations of patents should be limited even as access is pursued
in the short term.55
55 Better to allow the patent owner to provide solutions that
maintain
maintain its control over price and distribution
distribution and preserve its incentives
incentives to
innovate, than to allow governments
governments to develop their own rules for access.
Solutions
Solutions that flow from this approach include donations, patient
patient assistance
assistance
programs, and negotiated
low-cost sales to national governments in poor
programs,
negotiated low-cost
poor
countries, all without disturbing the basic monopoly framework of patent
rights. Preserving
Preserving the patent system, proponents
proponents argue, presents the best hope
for promoting access and alleviating
preserving
alleviating public health crises, because preserving

Id.
3, at 65-66).
65-66).
Id. at 325 (citing Sykes, supra note 3,
See
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau,
See Andrew
Beckerman-Rodau, Patent
Patent Law
Law - Balancing Profit Maximization and
and
SC. &
& TECH. L.
L. REV.
Public Access to Technology, 4 COLuM.
COLUM. SCI.
REV. 1,
\, 29 (2002),
(2002), available at
http://www.stlr.org/html/volume4/beckerman.pdf.
http://www.stir.orglhtmi/voiume4Ibeckennan.pdf.
53 Sykes, supra note 3,
"
3, at 67-68.
54
54 See id.
id. at 68.
55s See Beckerman-Rodau,
52, at 30.
Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 52,
51
"
52
52
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patent system
system also
also preserves
preserves the research
research and
and development
development that
that has
the patent
produced the
the current
current set
set of
of essential
essential medicines
medicines and will produce
produce the
the essential
essential
produced
medicines of
of the
the future. 56
medicines

C.

Political Lens
The Political

political problem,
problem, access
access is complicated
complicated by power
power asymmetries
asymmetries
Viewed as aa political
57
among the sovereign
sovereign players
players in the
the WT0
WT057
increased participation
participation by
and by increased
among
58
life sciences
sciences companies
companies in policymaking.
policymaking.58
The increased
increased macroeconomic
macroeconomic
The
life
importance of knowledge-intensive
knowledge-intensive industries,
industries, such
such as computer
computer technology
technology
importance
59
pharmaceuticals, has enhanced
enhanced the political
political influence
influence of those industries. 59
and pharmaceuticals,
notes, these companies
companies are
are well-resourced
well-resourced and organized;
organized;
commentator notes,
As one commentator
contribute so mightily
mightily to their states'
states' trade balances
balances that their
their interests
interests are
they contribute
60
highly integrated with
with those
those of
of the state.60
highly
policies pursued by states where
where the pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical industry
industry wields
The policies
followed a predictable
predictable path. The United States and
and
great influence have followed
European
TRIPS agreement,
establishing
agreement, establishing
European Union pushed for adoption of the TRIPS
minimum standards of intellectual
intellectual property protection
protection (including
(including patent
minimum
protection for medicines)
enticing developing countries
countries to abandon
abandon promedicines) and enticing
protection
access policies
policies with the promise
promise of full membership
membership in the club of important
important
access
Trade Organization. The United States supplemented
supplemented
trade partners, the World Trade
membership with the stick
stick of unilateral
unilateral trade sanctions in
the carrot of WTO membership
TRIPS. 6 1
convincing developing countries
countries to adopt
adopt the strong IP provisions
provisions of
ofTRIPS.61
convincing
of
Post-TRIPS, the Health Flexibility Waiver notwithstanding,
notwithstanding, the owners
owners of
Post-TRIPS,
patented drugs have insisted upon, and gotten, even stronger
stronger intellectual
intellectual
patented
property protection
protection to the detriment
detriment of access
access interests. In seeking to increase
property
Waiver essentially
essentially provides a way around patent rights. But the
access, the Waiver
West has insisted that a number of countries subject
subject themselves
themselves to restrictions
restrictions
intangible property, not squarely
treated by the
squarely treated
with respect to other types of intangible
62
For example, the
Waiver mechanism
mechanism (so-called
(so-called "TRIPS-Plus"
"TRIPS-Plus" policies).
policies).62
United States has been aggressive
aggressive in negotiating
negotiating bilateral and regional free
trade agreements
As") that place such heavy IP burdens on signatories
signatories as
("FTAs")
agreements ("FT
to preclude
compulsory licensing scheme, including the
preclude their participation in a compulsory
56
ss Id.
Id.
57
* The effects of political pressure were predicted from the time of the Decision. See
Ewelukwa, supra
"covert threats of economic sanctions" for
note II,
11, at 207 (promising "covert
supra note
countries who might think of using the Waiver).
Property and
58
Intellectual Property
Governance in Intellectual
for Global
Global Governance
" See Susan K. Sell, The Quest for
REv. 363,
Public
Health: Stn/ctural.
Dimensions, 77 TEMP. L. REV.
InstitutionalDimensions,
Discursive, and Institutional
Structural,Discursive.
Public Health:
364 (2004).
59
' See id.
id at 368.
60 See id.
60
id.
6' See
See Brook
K. Baker,
Ending Drug
Registration Apartheid:
Apartheid: Taming
Taming Data
Data Exclusivity
Exclusivity
61
Brook K.
Baker, Ending
Dn/g Registration
and
J3 (2008) (citing use by the
the
& MED. 303, 3313
Linkage, 34 AM. J.L. &
and Patent/Registration
Patent/RegistrationLinkage,
U.S.C. §§
United States Trade Representative
List powers under 19 U.S.c.
301 Watch List
Representative of its Special 301
2242 (2006)).
(2006)).
62 See
See HESTERMEYER,
HESTERMEYER, supra
supranote
note 37, at 289-90.
62
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one created
created by
by the Waiver. 63 The
The anti-access
anti-access provisions
provisions of these
these agreements
agreements
one
into three
three categories.
categories. The
The first
first is
is IP protection
protection for test data. For
For at
at least
least
fall into
years, a generic
generic manufacturer
manufacturer may
may not
not use test
test data or
or other
other proprietary
proprietary
five years,
information that
that the patent owner
owner has submitted
submitted to the relevant
relevant government
government for
for
receiving regulatory
regulatory approval
approval to market
market the drug. 64 In effect,
effect,
the purposes of receiving
this sort
sort of
of restriction
restriction makes
makes it difficult
difficult for a generic manufacturer
manufacturer to bring a
generic version
version of aa patented drug to market
market without conducting
conducting a full set of
of
clinical trials and generating
generating its own test data. Such
Such an endeavor
endeavor would
would be
costly (for an industry
industry with
with very thin profit margins)
margins) and lengthy
lengthy (delaying the
ability of patients
patients to get access
access to the generic
generic drug by
by years). As a practical
practical
the use of
of test data erects
erects a barrier to use of the
the
matter, the prohibition of the
Waiver and limits access
access despite
despite the fact that
that relaxation
relaxation of
of patent
patent requirements
requirements
Waiver
be access-promoting.
access-promoting.
should be
is
The second
second type of access-limiting
provision in free trade agreements
agreements is
access-limiting provision
65 Such
often called
called a "patent/registration
"patent/registration linkage"
Such a provision
linkage" provision. 65
essentially deputizes a signatory's food and drug regulatory
regulatory authority as a
patent infringement
infringement enforcement
enforcement agent. The regulatory
regulatory approval of any
any
patent
generic drug is delayed during the term of the relevant patent, unless
66 So, even if a generic meets
authorization is obtained from the patent owner.
owner.66
meets
authorization
Id.
fd. at 290.
2004, 43 1.L.M.
e.g., Free
Free Trade Agreement,
Agreement, U.S.U.S. - Austi.,
Austl., art. 17.10
17.10 §§1,I, May
May 18,
18,2004,43
I.L.M.
See, e.g.,
[hereinafter U.S.
http://tcc.export.gov/static/AFTA.full_text.pdf
U.S. - Austl.
text.pdf [hereinafter
1248, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/AFTA.full
14,2004,44
I.L.M. 544,
Agreement, U.S. - Bahr.,
Bahr., art. 14.9 §I,
FTA]; Free Trade Agreement,
§1, Sept. 14,
2004, 44 1.L.M.
[hereinafter U.S.
available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/TAA.BahrainFT
AChapterl4.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. http://tcc.export.gov/static/TAA.BahrainFTAChapterl4.pdf
I.L.M.
§1, June
June 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
Agreement, U.S.
U.S. - Chile, art. 17.10 §I,
Bahr. FTA]; Free Trade Agreement,
FTA];
1026, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/17.ipr.pdf
U.S. - Chile FT
A];
[hereinafter U.S.
http://tcc.export.gov/static/17.ipr.pdf [hereinafter
1026,
at
Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.
U.S. - Colom., art. 16.10 §2(a), Nov. 22, 2006, available al
Trade
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_sendIl336
U.S. - Colom. FTA]; KORUS Free
send/1336 [hereinafter
[hereinafter U.S.
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm
at
I.L.M. 642, available al
Trade Agreement, U.S.
U.S. - S. Korea, art. 18.9 §I,
1, 2007, 46 1.L.M.
§1, Apr. 1,2007,46
Trade
http://www .ustr .govIsitesl defaultlfi les/u p loads/agreements/fta/korus/asset_uploadfile273_1
up load_ fi le2 73_I
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/korus/asset
27
I 7.pdf[hereinafter
KORUS FTA]; Free Trade Agreement, U.S.
Morocco, art. 15.10
2717.pdf
[hereinafter KORUS
U.S.- - Morocco,
15.10 §§1,I,
http://tcc.export.gov/static/
I,
44
I.L.M.
http://tcc.export.gov/static/
available at
544,
1.L.M.
I, 2006,
Jan.
asset_upload_fiIe797
_3849.pdf [hereinafter
U.S. - Morocco FTA]; Free Trade
Trade Agreement,
Agreement,
asset
uploadfile797_3849.pdf
[hereinafter U.S.
U.S.
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
19, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/
1, Jan. 19,2006,
15.9 §§I,
U.S. - Oman, art. 15.9
[hereinafter U.S. - Oman
uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset_
_file715 _8809.pdf [hereinafter
uploadfile715_8809.pdf
uploads/agreements/fta/oman/asset upload
available
FTA]; Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.
U.S. -- Pan., art. 15.10 §2(a), June 28, 2007, available
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/defaultlfiles/uploads/agreements/fta/panama/
al
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/panamal
at
asset_upload_fiIeI31_10350.pdf
U.S. - Pan. FTA]; Trade Promotion
assetupload filel3 1 10350.pdf [hereinafter U.S.
http://www.ustr.gov/
Agreement, U.S.
12, 2006, available at http://www.ustr.gov/
U.S. -- Peru, art. 16.10 §2(a), Apr. 12,2006,
webfm_sendl1031
U.S. - Peru FTA]; Free Trade Agreement,
Agreement, U.S. - Sing., art.
[hereinafter U.S.
webfm_send/1031 [hereinafter
16.8 §§1,I, May 6, 2003, 42 I.L.M.
http://tcc.export.gov/static/text final.pdf
1026, available at http://tcc.export.gov/static/text_final.pdf
1.L.M. 1026,
[hereinafter
I, Aug. 5,
[hereinafter U.S.
U.S. - Sing. FTA]; CAFTA Free Trade Agreement, art.
art. 15.10 § 1,
5, 2004,
available
at
http://www
. ustr .govIs itesldefaultlfi les/uploads/agreements/cafta/
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/caftal
asset_upload_file934_3935.pdf
(CAFTA includes U.S.,
U.S., Costa Rica,
[hereinafter CAFTA] (CAFTA
assetupload file934_3935.pdf [hereinafter
Dom. Rep., EI
Nicar.).
El Sal., Gual.,
Guat., Hond., Nicar.).
65
65 Baker,
Baker, supra
supra note 61,
61, at 307.
66 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., U.S.
U.S. -- Austl.
Austl. FTA,
FTA, supra
supra note
note 64, §4;
§4; U.S. - Bahr. FTA,
FTA, supra
supra note 64, §2;
66
U.S.
supra note 64, §2(b); KORUS
§2; U.S. - Colom. FTA, supra
U.S. - Chile FTA, supra note 64, §2;
63
63
64
'
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the agency's
agency's approval
approval criteria
criteria to
to be
be marketed
marketed in
in the
the relevant
relevant country,
country,
for the
a
patent
of
to
the
existence
distribution
of
the
drug
could
be
due
existence
of
patent
due
be
delayed
could
distribution the
drug. Although
Although the
the Waiver
Waiver is supposed
supposed to provide
provide aa way around
around patents,
patents, it
does not address
address such
such linkages
linkages and
and thus
thus presents
presents an
an anti-access
anti-access loophole for
for
pharmaceutical
companies
and
their
governments.
pharmaceutical companies and their governments.
The third category
category of access-limiting
access-limiting provision
provision in aa typical
typical U.S.
U.S. free trade
trade
of
This
sort
revoking
a
patent.
the
grounds
for
agreement
is
the
limitation
on
revoking
This
sort
of
agreement the limitation
that
grounds
patent
to
those
provision
limits
the
grounds
for
revocation
of
a
patent
those
that
revocation
provision
67
could have been cited
cited in denying the patent
patent in the first place.67
One
could
only
FTA
may
subject
to
interpretation
of
such
a
provision
is
that
a
patent
subject
an
FT
A
may
only
a patent
such provision
interpretation
be revoked
revoked for fraud or
or for lack of
of novelty, utility/industrial
utilitylindustrial application,
application, or
or
as
access,
such
to
do
with
nonobviousness/inventive
step.
Reasons
having
access,
such
having
nonobviousness/inventive
unreasonable pricing,
pricing, failure to market,
market, etc.,
etc., do not seem
seem to be available
available to
unreasonable
668
8
FT
A
signatories.
FTA signatories.
Beyond the access-limiting
agreements to which the U.S.
U.S. has
access-limiting free trade agreements
has a
("USTR")
become
a
party,
the
States
Trade
Representative
Representative
Trade
United
become a
in
who
history
of
threatening
unilateral
sanctions
against
nations
engage
unilateral
threatening
history
69
69 Despite
reassure
compulsory
licensing.
Despite
USTR
"side
letters"
ostensibly
that
"side
letters"
USTR
compulsory
signatories that they may take steps to protect
protect public health, potential
potential importers
importers
signatories
of
and exporters
exporters under the Waiver
Waiver scheme are treading
treading carefully
carefully in the face of
70 The access-limiting power
threats
from
such
an
important
power
access-limiting
The
partner.
trading
important
threats
dynamic between
between rich
rich and poor countries
countries has also tainted
tainted several
several laudable
laudable
dynamic
complicating
humanitarian gestures
gestures in the eyes of some observers,
observers, further complicating
humanitarian
attempts to bridge
bridge the divide."
divide. 71 As one commentator
of
commentator put it, the totality of
attempts
rights and obligations
obligations actually practiced by TRIPS signatories "represent
"represent the
obligations
codification of political tradeoffs
tradeoffs masquerading
masquerading as positivist obligations
codification

FTA, supra
U.S. - Morocco
FTA, supra
supra note 64, §4; U.S.
U.S. - Oman FTA, supra
supra
Morocco FTA,
§2; U.S.
supra note 64, §2;
§2(b);
note 64, §2; U.S. - Pan. FTA, supra
supra note 64, §2(b);
§2(b); U.S. - Peru FTA, supra
supra note 64, §2(b);
CAFTA, supra
U.S.
supra note 64, §2.
supra note 64, §4; CAFTA,
U.S. - Sing. FTA, supra
67
U.S. - Austl.
§5; U.S.
U.S. - Bahr. FTA, supra
supra note
67 See,
See, e.g.,
e.g., U.S.
Austl. FTA, supra
supra note 64, art. 17.9 §5;
supra
U.S. - Colom. FTA, supra
64, art. 14.8
supra note 64, art. 17.9 §5; U.S.
U.S. - Chile FTA, supra
14.8 §4;
§4; U.S.
note 64, 16.9 §4; KORUS
KORUS FTA, supra
supra note 64, art. 18.8 §4; U.S. - Morocco FTA, supra
supra
supra
U.S. - Pan. FTA, supra
note 64, art. 15.9 §5; U.S.
supra note 64, art. 15.8 §4; U.S.
U.S. - Oman FTA, supra
supra
note 64, art. 15.9
supra note 64, art. 16.9 §4; U.S. - Sing. FTA, supra
15.9 §4; U.S. - Peru FTA, supra
note 64, art. 16.7 §4; CAFT
A, supra
art. 15.9 §4.
supra note 64, art.
CAFTA,
6 See,
e.g., HESTERMEYER,
supra note 37, at 290.
68
See, e.g.,
HESTERMEYER, supra
of
69
Argentina have been at the receiving end of
69Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, India, and Argentina
such threats. See Baker,
Baker, supra
61, at 317.
supranote 61,
70 Id.
70
Id. at 331-32.
71 See Gathii, supra
supra note 10,
10, at 268; Michelle M. Nerozzi, The Battle Over Life-Saving
71
Life-Saving
Pharmaceuticals: Are Developing Countries Being "TRIPped" by Developed Countries?,
47 VILL.
nn.119-120
program
19-120 (citing strings attached to Pfizer's donation program
605, 631 nn.l
VILL. L. REV.
REv. 605,631
Fungus
for the HIV/AIDS
also Barbara Crossette, AIDS Fungus
(Diflucan)). See also
Fluconazole (Diflucan».
drug Fluconazole
HIV/AIDS drug
Part 2, THE
Story: Part
Dnlg
A3; AIDS Story:
200 1, at A3;
7, 2001,
Nations, N.Y. TIMES, June 7,
Poor Nations,
Drug Offered to Poor
GUARDIAN
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2000/
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldl2000/
13, available
available at
2, 2000, at
at 13,
(UK), Dec. 2,
GUARDIAN (UK),
dec/02/aids.
weekend7.
dec/02/aids.weekend7.

HeinOnline -- 16 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 181 2010

B. U.
SCI. &
& TECH.
L.
U.1.
J SC.
TECH. L.

182
182

[Vol. 16:167

72
imposed by law."
law."72
imposed

IV. RECALIBRATING
RECALIBRATING THE LENSES
LENSES
The views described supra
other
supra are more often than not at odds with each other
and indicate a problem that is not even simply stated, let alone solved. A view
problem that will ultimately lead to a solution, however, must
of the access problem
First, the market
acknowledge
acknowledge some shortcomings
shortcomings on all fronts.
responsibility on the part of
of
fundamentalist argument
argument tends to ignore a responsibility
pharmaceutical patent owners to the global human community.
community. Given the
pharmaceutical
enormous
pharmaceutical companies
enormous profits earned
earned by multinational pharmaceutical
companies in the
developed
financed publicly, aggressive expansion
expansion
developed world, some of which are financed
of access in the developing world, even at the cost of some of those profits,
does not seem too much to ask. Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical company
company profits have been
been
described in economic
supra-optimal rents and should be able to
described
economic terms as supra-optimal
absorb the cost of monitoring and enforcing an access scheme without harming
harming
absorb
73
innovation.73
The sense of responsibility should be heightened
heightened by the fact that low-access
low-access
nations are not a plausible source of market-rate sales for the therapies
therapies in
in
74
question. 74
So there are few, if any, lost sales attributable
attributable to humanitarian
humanitarian
solutions. Further, for every day that the access problem is not solved, there is
is
both a current cost in human lives and a future cost in the value of the local
market. If a country is destabilized
/ AIDS or
HIV/AIDS
destabilized by catastrophic
catastrophic diseases like HIV
malaria, its economy will never mature into a viable market for the
pharmaceutical
chronic care therapies
therapies and lifestyle drugs.
pharmaceutical industry'S
industry's chronic
Ultimately, global growth depends on solving the access problem in the short
Ultimately,
term.
On the other hand, minimizing certain
certain other realities of the market, as some
proponents of the pure humanitarian
humanitarian view do, may place the long-term
long-term access
access
proponents
effort in jeopardy. Unfortunately,
Unfortunately, access solutions that reduce control over
patent owner's long-term
price and supply may have a negative impact on the patent
financial viability. For example, losing control over supply often means that a
imports, or gray market goods. If
patent owner cannot prevent trade in parallel imports,
medicines are diverted from a low price market to a high price market, the
medicines
shareholder
market, and shareholder
expected sales in the high price market,
patent owner will lose expected
suffer.7755 Any sort of differential pricing creates an attractive
value may suffer.

2
72

Ruth L.Okediji,
L.Okediji, The
Ruth
The International
International Relations
Relations of Intellectual Property: Narratives of
of

J.
Developing Country
Property System, 7 SING.
SING. J.
Intellectual Property
Country Participation
Participationin the Global
Global Intellectual
Developing
INT'L & COMP. L. 315, 339 (2003).
INT'L&COMP.
1 See Kevin
Kevin Outterson,
73
Outterson, Pharmaceutical
Pharmaceutical Arbitrage:
Arbitrage: Balancing
Balancing Access and Innovation
Innovation in
J. HEALTH POL'y
193, 223
Prescription Drug
Drug Markets, 5 YALE J.
POL'Y L. & ETHICS
ETHICS 193,
International Prescription
(2005).
(2005).
74 For example, the average annual price of a first-line ARV in the United States is
74
$20,000 annually. Id
Id. at 251; see also Lanjouw,
$7,215 per capita. One drug, Fuzeon, costs S20,000
S7,215
supra note 12, at 100,
100, 104.
75
argued that differential pricing
pricing to enhance access can lead to the
the
" It has also been argued
expectation of lower
lower list prices
prices in developed
developed markets, which would also impact the profit
expectation
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arbitrage opportunity. Local prices
prices in the importing country are low, prices
prices in
other markets
markets (including the European
European Union and the United States)
States) may be
be
much higher, and as long as transportation and other transactions
transactions costs are
sufficiently low, some entrepreneur
can be expected
expected to take advantage
advantage of the
entrepreneur can
opportunity to engage in parallel
parallel trade with the drugs at issue.
The prevalence
prevalence and effect
effect of parallel trade are in dispute. The incentive
incentive to
to
engage in gray market
market sales
sales of drugs lies not with consumers, patent owners, or
governments, but with other actors who interact
interact with the distribution chain,
such as local manufacturers, distributors/transport
distributors/transport agents, or individual
76
government officials.
officialsJ6
Diversion diminishes
diminishes local supply and may lead to
to
Diversion
higher local prices and decreased welfare for the consumers in need of the
77 On the other hand, documented
medicine.77
cases of major diversion are hard
documented cases
to come by, minor diversion
diversion is fairly easily absorbed, and techniques exist for
thwarting any attempt at large-scale
large-scale diversion.1
diversion does
diversion.788 Whatever diversion
exist, however, potentially
circumvents the industry's efforts to maintain drug
potentially circumvents
quality and safety in its distribution
distribution chain. 79 So, even a small amount of
of
diversion could
could lead to social welfare losses. Given
Given the uncertainty
uncertainty involved,
even if they don't go quite so far rhetorically, it should not be surprising for
executives and managers
managers of patent
patent owners to reject any solution that adds
volatility to a pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical company's profit calculus. Such volatility is sure
to lead
lead to access-limiting behavior on the part of managers.
managers. Any access
access
solution that expects not to be undermined
undermined by pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical patent owners
must acknowledge
acknowledge and deal with the risk of diversion.
The TRIPS solution to the parallel import issue focuses on the physical
characteristics
Decision requires
requires that:
characteristics of the product. The August 30 Decision

necessary to meet the needs of the eligible importing
(i) only the amount necessary
manufactured under the licence and the entirety of this
Member(s) may be manufactured
production
exported to the Member(s)
Member(s) which has notified
notified its
production shall be exported
needs to the Council for TRIPS;
(ii) products produced
identified as
(ii)
produced under
under the licence shall be clearly identified
produced under the system set out in this Decision
being produced
Decision through specific
specific

calculus of the patent
patent owner. See Cotter,
Cotter, supra note 50, at 338.
76
Parallel Trade
Product Access and
7 See Harvey E. Bale, Jr., The Conflicts
Conflicts Between Parallel
Trade and Product
Innovation:
J. INT'L
INT'L ECON.
ECON. L. 637, 638 (1998).
(1998).
Innovation: The Case
Case of Pharmaceuticals,
Pharmaceuticals,I1 J.
77
Id. at 648.
n Id.
78 See Outterson,
supra note 73, at 261-67
261-67,, (detailing
78
Outterson, supra
(detailing the lack of documented
documented diversion
diversion
cases and distinguishing
distinguishing acceptable
acceptable from unacceptable
supra note
unacceptable parallel trade); Lanjouw, supra
12,
(describing policy tools for dealing with diversion risk, including export controls,
12, at 110 (describing
packaging); Sloan
distribution chain monitoring, distinctive
distinctive pill design, and distinctive packaging);
Pearson,
20, 2003 Decision
Decision of the WTO Provide
Provide Adequate Protection
Protection for
for
Pearson, Will the August 20,
Patent
Diversion Still a Threat
Industry?, 5 J.
PharmaceuticalIndustry?,
J.
and is Diversion
Threat to the Pharmaceutical
Patent Holders
Holders Rights and
HIGH TECH. L. 381,
381, 396 (2005)
(2005) (providing
(providing examples
examples of physical differentiation between
market pharmaceutical
pharmaceutical products
products and their donated versions).
7 See Claude E.
79
E. Barfield
Barfield &
& Mark A. Groombridge, Parallel
Parallel Trade
Trade in the

and Health
Welfare, and
Innovation, Consumer
Consumer Welfare,
Health
Pharmaceutical
Industry: Implications
Implications for Innovation,
PharmaceuticalIndustry:
ENT. LJ.
L.J. 185,254
Policy,
Policy, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
185, 254 (1999).
(1999).

HeinOnline -- 16 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 183 2010

184
184

B. U. J.
1. SCI.
SCI. &
& TECH. L.
B.

[Vol. 16:167
16:167
[Vol.

labelling or
or marking.
marking. Suppliers
Suppliers should distinguish
distinguish such
such products
products through
labelling
special packaging
packaging and/or
and/or special
special colouring/shaping
colouring/shaping of the products
products
special
themselves, provided
provided that such
such distinction
distinction is
is feasible and
and does
does not
not have a
themselves,
significant impact
impact on price;
price; and
and
significant
(iii) before
before shipment
shipment begins,
begins, the licensee
licensee shall post on
on aa website
website the
(iii)
following information:
- the quantities
quantities being supplied to each
each destination
destination as referred
referred to in
indent (i) above; and
distinguishing features of the product(s)
product(s) referred to
to in indent
indent (ii)
(ii)
- the distinguishing
8o
above.80
above.
General Council Chairperson's
Chairperson's Statement
Statement regarding
regarding the Decision
Decision further
further
The General
outlines best practices
practices with respect
respect to diversion;
diversion; again, these
these best practices
practices
outlines
focus mainly on physical
physical characteristics
characteristics of the pills and packaging being
being
produced.881'
produced.
While rendering
rendering the products produced
identifiable
produced under the waiver easily identifiable
While
is an important
important piece of the solution to the diversion
diversion problem, it is only a piece.
Distinctive coloring,
coloring, packaging, labeling,
labeling, and
and other trade dress do little to
to
dissuade traffic that is not necessarily
necessarily conducted
conducted in full view of all the
interested
parties. A more robust set of solutions should focus on
on the
interested parties.
compulsory license, and the incentives that it creates.
creates. The role of the
discussion of its actual
actual
compulsory license
license is often misunderstood,82
misunderstood, 82 and some discussion
role and import is warranted.
83 This is despite
Generally, in practice,
practice, compulsory licensing is very rare.83
despite
the existence of many laws (including
(including Paragraph
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration)
engaging in
allowing such licensing.
For at least some countries, not engaging
Face-saving
compulsory licensing may be a matter of "face"
"face" or reputation.8844 Face-saving
non-utilization
validates early predictions
predictions that the
compulsory licensing validates
non-utilization of compulsory
Waiver system would not alone increase access, and that it was more important
85 There is little
as a political statement than as a serviceable
serviceable licensing scheme.85
guidance as to the substance of the compulsory license, that is, what it should
Declaration, supra note 44, at §2(b).
§2(b).
See General
General Council, General Council Chairperson's Statement, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov.
http://www.wto.orglenglish/tratop_EITRIPS_e/
13,
2003),
http://www.wto.org/english/tratopE/TRIPSe/
at
available
2003),
13,
gc
_ stat_30aug03 _ e.htm.
gcstat_30aug03_e.htm.
Pharmaceutical
82 See Arnoldo Lacayo, Comment, Seeking a Balance: International Pharmaceutical
Bio-Terrorism, 33 U.
U.
Patent Protection,
Crises, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism,
Protection, Public Health Crises,
MIAMI INTER-AM.
I 7 (2002); Cotter, supra note 50, at 324; Marques, supra
INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 3317
note 36, at 474; Christine A. Chung, Note, A
Inflexible
CAFTA's Inflexible
A Cry for Cheap Drugs: CAFTA's
Intellectual Property Protections Create an Ominous Impact on Life-Saving Medicines,
13
Medicines, 13
Sw. J.L. & TRADE
TRADE AM. 171,
3, at 55.
171, 182 (2006), Sykes, supra note 3,
83
& n.7 (arguing that for most of the decade
8, at 746-47
746-47 &
Attaran, supra note 8,
83 See Attaran,
"finished medicines
medicines on an
preceding 2003, almost no country compulsorily
compulsorily licensed "finished
preceding
extensive scale").
84 Id.
Id. at 750.
Medicines
Essential Medicines
85
Patents, Politics and Public Health: Access to Essential
85 See Scott Lucyk, Patents,
Under
L. REV. 191,
191, 194 (2006-07).
(2006-07).
OTEAAWA L.
Under the
the TRIPS Agreement, 38 OlTAWA
80
80 Doha
81
81
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actually say. Uncertainty
Uncertainty about license terms,
tenns, including what constitutes
constitutes
"adequate
remuneration," may be a hindrance
"adequate remuneration,"
hindrance to compulsory licenses in
86 In the face of diversion and
general,
general, not only under the Waiver scheme.86
and
arbitrage
arbitrage risk, it is dismaying,
dismaying, but not surprising, that IP-exporting countries
TRIPS-plus provisions that discourage use of the Waiver. There
have imposed TRIPS-plus
is no assurance
assurance that any licenses coming out of the Waiver scheme would
would
approximate
owner would want
want out of a licensing
approximate anything
anything that an IP owner
arrangement.8787 There remains too much
arrangement.
much opportunity
opportunity for strategic behavior on
the part of others (governments,
parties) and not enough
enough recourse to de(governments, third parties)
incentivize
compulsory licensing laws and
and
incentivize such behavior. The main use of compulsory
schemes
patented
schemes seems to be as a lever to influence
influence price negotiations
negotiations on patented
Brazil has been so successful at this negotiating
negotiating tactic that other
drugs. Brazil
other
88
countries are adopting it as an access tool.88
Several commentators
commentators have examined
examined the license, mainly
mainly by focusing on
streamlining the process, rather than adopting particular
streamlining
particular substantive tenns.
terms.
Amir Attaran
Attaran proposes
proposes a "non-justiciability"
access problem,
"non-justiciability" solution to the access
89
excusing manufacture under compulsory
excusing
compulsory license under certain conditions.89
dispute resolution
resolution
The manufacturing
manufacturing country would be shielded from WTO dispute
proceedings under the Attaran
Attaran proposal,
provided the parties
parties to the license
proceedings
proposal, provided
meet any of three criteria: (I)
importing country
country has a per capita
capita income of
of
(1) the importing
$2,935 or less, (2)
(2) the importing
importing country has "an
$2,935
"an adult HIV seroprevalence
seroprevalence of
of
one percent
percent or greater,"
greater," or (3)
country faces an "acute
(3) the importing country
"acute public
90
health emergency."
emergency."90
As the actual use of compulsory licenses is
circumscribed
circumscribed in the first place, Attaran argues that non-justiciability
non-justiciability based on
objective
highlights the limited downside
downside of Paragraph
Paragraph 6 and makes it
objective criteria highlights
9
palatable to patent owners
owners and their governments. 91
more palatable
1
Frederick Abbott and Jerome Reichman
have
advocated a "pooled"
Reichman
"pooled"
licensing
licensing approach to address the unresolved
unresolved public action problem at the heart
92 Under such a scheme, a number of countries
of the access issue. 92
countries could pool
compulsory licenses
compulsory
licenses in order to promote economies
economies of scale in manufacturing
manufacturing
decreasing costs and increasing purchasing
purchasing power/leverage
and procurement,
procurement, decreasing
power/leverage

86 See
See Antony
Taubman, Rethinking
Rethinking TRIPS: 'Adequate
'Adequate Remuneration' for
Antony Taubman,
for NonECON. L. 927,
927, 932 (2008).
Voluntary Patent Licensing, 11
1IJ.J.INT'L
INT'L ECON.
86

87
negotiated, market-driven
license, key terms might include term/duration of
" In a negotiated,
market-driven license,
of
license; defined royalty or royalty
royalty calculation; scope of licensed technology
territory;
technology and of territory;
requirements
inspection; default,
requirements regarding sales and royalty records, reporting, and inspection;
termination, and acceleration
acceleration provisions; and representations
representations and warranties
warranties of the parties.
88
Foreign
8 See Robert Bird &
& Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory
Compulsory Licensing
Licensing on Foreign
Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM.
L.J. 283, 316 (2008).
AM. Bus. LJ.
89
supra note 8, at 769.
89 Attaran, supra
90
Id. at 760-64.
9o ld.
91
743-44.
9' See id. at 743-44.
9 Frederick
92
Frederick M. Abbott &
& Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha
Doha Round's Public
Public Health
Health
Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Difjilsion
Diffusion of Patented Medicines Under the
ECON. L. 921,
921, 921-22
921-22 (2007).
Amended TRIPS
TRIPS Provisions, 10 J.
J. INT'L ECON.
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93
both originator
originator drug
drug companies
companies and
and generic
generic producers.
producers.93
with both
Khoury proffers
proffers an enhanced
enhanced compulsory
compulsory licensing
licensing model,
model, calling
calling for
for
Amir Khoury
retroactive compensation
compensation for patent
patent owners,
owners, avoiding
avoiding production
production slowdowns
slowdowns
retroactive
94
Royalties
and enabling
enabling exporting
exporting and
and importing
importing nations to act
act quickly.
quickly.94
Royalties
would be paid
paid to patent
patent owners only if itit was
was proved
proved ex post that the
compulsory license
license was
was employed
employed without justification
justification under
under TRIPS.
TRIPS. Further,
Further,
compulsory
the importing state made no profit on the
the distribution
distribution of
of the
the drug, no
no royalty
if the
license would
would be
be limited, the
the World
World Health
would be owed. The term of the license
Organization would
would participate
participate in
in the
the settlement
settlement of disputes,
disputes, and data
data
Organization
exclusivity provisions
provisions of TRIPS-plus
TRIPS-plus agreements
agreements would
would be
be relaxed. 95 Robert
Robert
exclusivity
Bird and
and Daniel
Daniel Cahoy
Cahoy suggest
suggest a regionally
regionally coordinated
coordinated license
license akin to the
the
Bird
pooled license strategy
strategy discussed
discussed supra.
supra. Regional
Regional trade
trade associations,
associations, rather
rather
pooled
than individual
individual nations,
nations, could issue the license
license and bargain
bargain collectively
collectively over its
its
than
incentive to launch such a scheme is greatly
greatly diminished by
by the
the
terms. The incentive
96
TRIPS-plus tactics
tactics of the West, as Bird and Cahoy observe. 96
TRIPS-plus

V.

A MODEL
MODEL FOR A
A CO-OP
Co-OP LICENSING SCHEME
A

access
Although the debate
debate is not often framed in these terms, the access
conundrum stems in part
part from the desire of multiple interdependent
interdependent actors to
to
conundrum
of
maximize their welfare,
welfare, all the
the while taking
taking into account the likely actions
actions of
competing wealth-maximizers
wealth-maximizers in the same system. Game theory represents
represents a
competing
useful tool for analyzing
analyzing the parties'
parties' incentives
incentives and ways in which re97
alignment of such incentives
incentives may yield more socially
socially desirable outcomes.
outcomes. 97
Problems of intellectual property, international trade, and international
international
relations have proven amenable
amenable to game theoretic treatment;
treatment; and the access
problem, which
which combines
combines elements of all three disciplines, is ripe for such
such
98
analysis. 98
This Article is particularly
particularly interested in applications
applications of non-cooperative
non-cooperative
game theory, in which the player's only concern is maximizing its own
own
be
individual payoffs within the parameters
parameters of the game. 99 Behavior that could be
individual

973-74.
id. at 973-74.
9 See id.
Amir H. Khoury, The "Public Health" of the Conventional International Patent
Regime &
Medicines, 26 CARDOZO ARTS &
"Ethicals:" Access to Patented Medicines,
& the Ethics of "Ethicals:"
LJ. 25, 59 (2008).
ENT. L.J.
95
95 See id.
id at 58-63.
96 See Bird &
& Cahoy,
Cahoy, supra note 88, at 328.
97
described as seeking to "explore
"explore how people make decisions if
97 Game theory has been described
their actions and fates depend on the actions of others."
others." Note, Finding Strategic Corporate
(quoting
Citizenship: A
Theoretic View, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1957, 1959 (2004) (quoting
A New Game Theoretic
INTRODUCTION Xii
PETER C. ORDESHOOK,
THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION
xii
THEORY AND POLITICAL THEORY:
ORDESHOOK, GAME THEORY
(1986».
(1986)).
98
J. Katopis,
Katopis, Perfect
& Cahoy, supra note 88, at 321-28; Chris J.
e.g., Bird &
98 See, e.g.,
TECH.
J.L. && TECH.
10 YALE
ALE J.L.
Happiness?: Game Theory as a Tool for
Quality, lOY
for Enhancing Patent Quality,
360 (2007-08);
Toward a Game Theoretic
Gambit: Toward
Jr., The Privacy Gambit:
E. Anderson,
Anderson, Jr.,
(2007-08); Horace E.
(2006).
1, 28 (2006).
Approach to International Data Protection, 99 VAND. J.J.ENT. &
& TECH.
TECH. L. I,
99
(1990).
ECONOMIC MODELLING 9 (1990).
99 See DAVID
DAVID M. KREPS, GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC
93

94
94
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labeled "cooperative"
"collaborative" generally
generally comes about under such a
"cooperative" or "collaborative"
00
regime if the behavior
behavior serves the best individual interests
interests of the actors. IOO
A
non-cooperative situations is the normal form, or
primary tool in analyzing
analyzing non-cooperative
strategic form game. One version of the normal form game is the well-known
In the normal form game, the players
Prisoner's Dilemma.
Dilemma.
players move
knowledge of the other player's choice of move.
simultaneously and without knowledge
Three key elements make up the normal form game:
game: (1) the players, (2)
the
(2) the
strategies available
available to them, and (3)
(3) the payoff to each
each player for each
0
combination
combination of player strategies.
strategies.'101
'
illustrates a typical
typical embodiment of a normal form game in
David Kreps illustrates
matrix format using the children's game Rock-Paper-Scissors
Rock-Paper-Scissors to outline
outline
strategies and payoffs. Assuming two children,
children, Alan and Beth, each with a
strategy set (Throw Rock, Throw Paper, or Throw
Throw Scissors), and each standing
standing
to win a point if favored by the combination, lose a point if disfavored
disfavored by the
combination, or stand pat if the combination
payoffs from a
combination is a draw. The payoffs
Rock-Paper-Scissors
game
can
be
modeled
as
follows
(in
each
set of payoffs,
Rock-Paper-Scissors
can
(in
Alan's payoff
payoff appears before the comma, and Beth's payoff
payoff appears after the
02
comma):
comma):1102

Figure A

Rock
Alan

Rock
Paper
Scissors

0,0
1,-1
1,-1
-1,1
-1,1

Beth
Beth
Paper
PaIJer
-1,1
-1,1
0,0
1,-1
1,-1

Scissors
1,-1
1,-1
-1,1

0,0
0,0

A game may be "solved"
"solved" by deducing which strategies
strategies players are likely to
adopt, given the potential payoff to the player and given what that player
03
knows about the other player's
player's goals, available strategies, and payoffs. 103
The
players can be expected to gravitate toward strategies
strategies that deliver them higher
proceed
payoffs, and the solution concepts of non-cooperative
non-cooperative game theory proceed
04
under that assumption.
assumption.1104
A normal form game model of the Health Flexibility Waiver system might
might
include three players, a Patent Owner ("PO"), a country
country taking advantage
advantage of
of
the Waiver
Waiver ("Waiver Country"
"We"), and a Distributor/Diverter
("D").
Distributor/Diverter ("D").
Country" or "WC"),
strategies are
For purposes
purposes of this model, we assume that the players'
players' available strategies
10o
100 Id.
Id.

1o See

DOUGLAS G.
BAIRD, ROBERT
GERTNER & RANDAL PICKER,
PICKER, GAME
THEORY AND
GAME THEORY
ROBERT GERTNER
DOUGLAS
G. BAIRD,
8 (1994).
(1994).
102 See KREPS,
KREPS, supra
supra note 99, at 1O-1l.
'02
10-11.
103See id.
103
id
104 Although much has been made of the failure of the rationality assumption in
economic theory, this Article assumes that, regardless of whether possession of dollars or
or
widgets is important
important to aa particular person,
person, that person has some capacity for making
decisions that are consistent with his tastes and goals.
101

THE LAW
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as follows: WC may choose License or Forego, that is, issue a compulsory
license under the Waiver or forego issuance
issuance of a compulsory license, relying
relying
market and the largesse of PO to meet its people's
people's needs. D
D may choose
on the market
manufactured under the
Divert or Refrain, either choosing
choosing to divert medicines
medicines manufactured
the
license to the gray market or leaving the distribution chain undisturbed.
strategy
Although PO does not play in the first iteration of this game, its strategy
choices in a later iteration will be Introduce or Withhold, that is, either
either
introduce
introduce its drug in WC's local market, or decline to do so.
Precise payoffs for each
each of the strategies
to
strategies in the game are difficult to
calculate, but we can posit the components of each player's expected
expected result.
current
WC's payoff in the License/Forego
License/Forego strategy decision will depend on current
of
revenues from the license
license (either direct revenues
revenues or taxes on the revenues of
compulsory licensee),
the compulsory
licensee), current cost of licensing (including
(including royalties
royalties paid to
current costs of manufacturing
manufacturing and distribution, current costs of local
PO), current
innovation
innovation (adaptive
(adaptive know-how associated
associated with optimizing formulation and
delivery systems for local conditions), future public health and development
development
gains from stabilizing the situation with regard to the relevant
relevant disease, and
potential cost of retaliation by PO (or
(or its government) in the event of diversion
potential
patent rights.
or other disrespect of PO's patent
choice of Divert versus Refrain will depend
depend on
on
payoff from D's strategy choice
The payoff
potential current revenues
revenues from diversion to the gray market, any current
current direct
potential
associated with the diversion
diversion (including
(including transportation and other
costs associated
pharmaceutical
transaction costs), the opportunity cost of engaging in pharmaceutical
transaction
diversion rather than other economic
economic activity, the cost incurred
incurred if its activities
diversion
(including fines or imprisonment,
imprisonment, depending on local law),
law), and the
are detected (including
likelihood of detection (including the inclination
likelihood
inclination of WC toward detection and
the resources available
available for detection-related
detection-related activities).
Although PO does not play in this game's
game's first iteration, we will describe
here the components
components of its payoff,
because it will receive
receive payoffs based on the
the
payoff, because
here
moves of the other two players even ifit
be
if it does not move. PO's payoff might be
comprised of current
current revenues
revenues (from regular sales or from royalties relating to
to
comprised
licensee's manufacture of PO's drug under compulsory
compulsory license), lost sales in
a licensee's
markets), current
the event of diversion
diversion (in the instant market and in foreign markets),
current
cost savings
savings from reduction or elimination of its own local supply chain, future
(adaptive
revenues in the local market, and future benefits of local innovation (adaptive
know-how associated
optimizing formulation and delivery systems for
associated with optimizing
know-how
local conditions).
For purposes of this game, in the event of a License decision, we posit
posit
current revenues for WC of 10,
licensing cost (including
(including royalty
royalty paid) of 3,
current
10, a licensing
manufacturing
(including the cost of innovating
innovating to
distribution cost (including
manufacturing and distribution
conditions) of 3, and some
optimize manufacturing
manufacturing and distribution for local conditions)
future gain from improvements
improvements in public health, the present value of which
which is
105 WC's
4.1o5
at least as much as current income from compulsory
compulsory licensing, or 4.
WC's
105
"os It should be noted that the values used in this model are stylized for simplification
purposes, but they attempt to reflect rough orders of magnitude with regard to actual factors.
Pharmaceutical Sales 2000 - 2007, http://www.imshealth.com/
http://www.imshealth.com/
See IMS, Global Pharmaceutical
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total payoff from licensing should
should then be 10-3-3+4,
10-3-3+4, or 8.
8. If WC licenses and
D diverts, say,
say, 50% of the licensee's stock, WC's revenues fall to 5,
D
5, its costs
and its future gains are erased as treatment does not reach a
remain unchanged, and
critical mass of its populace. In this event, WC's total payofffalls
payoff falls to -\.
-1.
If WC foregoes, it earns no revenues from licensing, and it incurs no costs
associated
manufacturing or distribution. WC misses out on the future
associated with manufacturing
gains from stabilization
stabilization of the public health situation, but it may receive other
gains from this strategy. If WC forgoes, it is likely to be in compliance with
the expectations
expectations of PO and its government
government under the relevant free trade
agreement
agreement or bilateral trade agreement. If PO and its government are satisfied
satisfied
with WC's performance, then drug donations and favorable trade treatment
treatment
may follow.
follow. We assume that such favorable treatment
treatment is worth 3 to WC. If
WC forgoes and D diverts, WC will earn no licensing revenues, incur no costs,
and receive
receive a perhaps slightly diminished
diminished gain from PO (e.g.,
(e.g., if diversionary
activity affects donated drugs or any market rate drugs in circulation).
circulation). WC's
WC's
total payoff in this event is 2.
D faces a strategy choice of Divert vs. Refrain. Assuming
Assuming that D's direct
costs of diversion (transportation,
(transportation, mainly),
mainly), opportunity
opportunity costs of diversion (from
(from
not pursuing other economic activity),
activity), likelihood
likelihood of detection,
detection, and cost of
of
being detected remain low, Divert is a profitable
profitable strategy for D, allowing him
him
to reap all or most of the revenue from diverting the product. Diverting
Diverting 50%
of production
production in the event of a License decision by WC will lead to a payoff
payoff
for D of 5.
5. Even if WC foregoes, there will still be a positive
positive payoff to be had
by D, by siphoning of some of the other gains that WC receives for foregoing
(Donated
(Donated and/or market
market rate medicines
medicines can
can be diverted
diverted as readily as
compulsorily licensed
compulsorily
licensed ones). The gain from diversion is greater under
(License,
(License, Divert) than it is under (Forego, Divert), because there are more
06
commerce under
drugs in the stream of commerce
under the former combination
combination of
of strategies.1
strategies. I06
D's total payoff
falls to 2 under (Forego,
payofffalls
(Forego, Divert).
PO's full (worldwide)
(worldwide) revenues
revenues are assumed
assumed to be 100.
100. In the event of a
Refrain strategy
strategy being employed by D, PO earns
earns its full revenues. If there is
diversion, PO is assumed to suffer
suffer a 20%
20% reduction
reduction in revenues
revenues in
in high price
price
markets, to 80. If WC licenses,
licenses, PO will receive some benefit
benefit in future periods
from WC's local innovation. Some portion
portion of such innovation could
could become
become
deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/Content/StaticFile/TopLine_Data/GlobalSales.pdf
deployedfiles/imshealth/Global/ContentiStaticFilerrop_Line _ DataiG 10balSales.pdf (global
(global
pharmaceutical
phannaceutical sales
sales were approximately
approximately $700B
$700B in 2007)
2007) (last
(last visited
visited June
June 7, 2010);
20 I 0); About
About
Phrma,
Phnna, http://www.phrma.org/about_phrma/
http://www.phnna.orglabout~hnnal
(global pharmaceutical
phannaceutical research
research and
and
development
approximately S65B
DAVID
development spending
spending was
was approximately
$65B in 2009)
2009) (last
(last visited June 7, 2010);
20 I 0); DAVID
R. SUGDEN,
SUGDEN, GRAY MARKETS:
MARKETS: PREVENTION,
PREVENTION, DETECTION,
DETECTION, AND
AND LITIGATION
LITIGA nON 24
24 (2009)
(2009) (revenues
(revenues
lost to the gray
gray market annually of
of approximately
approximately SlOB);
$IOB); Medicines
Medicines Australia,
Australia, Global
Global
Pharmaceutical Industry
Phannaceutical
Industry - Facts at a Glance,
Glance, http://www.medicinesaustralia.com.au/
http://www.medicinesaustralia.com.au/
pages/images/Global%20-%20facts%20at%20a%20glance.pdf
pages/images/Global%20-%20facts%20at%20a%20glance.pdf (market
(market share
share in the
the
developed
developing world: North America:
developed vs. developing
America: 45%, Europe:
Europe: 20%,
20%, Japan:
Japan: 10%,
10%, United
United
Kingdom: 3%, Australia:
Kingdom:
Australia: 1%, Rest of
of World,
World, including
including many
many of
of the markets
markets that are
potential
potential Waiver
Waiver Countries:
Countries: 21%) (last visited June 7, 2010).
106
106 (Donated
(Donated Drugs +
+ Market
Market Rate
Rate Drugs
Drugs +
+ Licensed
Licensed Drugs)
Drugs) vs.
vs. (Donated
(Donated Drugs
Drugs +
Market
Market Rate
Rate Drugs).
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PO's overall store
store of
of know-how,
know-how, and
and could feed
feed product
product development
development
part of PO's
other markets.
markets. We assume
assume for simplicity
simplicity that PO's gain
gain from local
local
in other
WC's local
local innovation
innovation expenditure
expenditure of 3. A
A License
License
innovation is equivalent
equivalent to WC's
innovation
strategy by WC also increases
increases PO's revenues
revenues in future periods (due to the
strategy
economic stabilization
stabilization that should
should flow
flow from public health stabilization).
stabilization). We
We
economic
equivalent to
that the
the present value of
of such
such increased
increased revenues
revenues is equivalent
will assume that
current worldwide
worldwide revenues. If WC foregoes, PO receives
receives no
no
5% of PO's current
5%
benefit from local
local innovation, and its revenues
revenues are flat in future periods. The
The
benefit
payoffs of all three players are given in the table below
below for each
each combination
combination
payoffs
strategies by WC
WC and D. In each cell,
cell, WC's
WC's payoff is given
given first, D's payoff
payoff
of strategies
second, and PO's payoff
payoff third.
second,

Figure B

WC

License
License
Forego
Forego

D
Refrain
Refrain
8,0,
8, 0, 108
3,0, 100
3,0,100

Divert
5, 88
-1,5,88
-1,
2,2,80

0 7 No matter which
which
Divert strategy is
is strictly dominant. I07
In this game, D's Divert
chooses, D is better
better off choosing
choosing Divert and may be expected
expected
strategy WC chooses,
strategy is
is
always to do so. Given that D will always choose Divert, WC's best strategy
licensing and
Choosing Forego
Forego saves WC the costs associated with licensing
and
Forego. Choosing
delivers some benefit in the way of largesse from PO. Licensing
Licensing in the face of
of
D's Divert strategy is a recipe for a negative payoff. This outcome of the game
produces equilibrium without producing an access solution. The players
maximize their payoffs in understandable
understandable but access-limiting
access-limiting ways.
maximize
necessarily a
opportunity is not necessarily
It should be noted that the foregone access opportunity
of
benefits from a License decision in the form of
win for PO. PO reaps potential benefits
local innovation gains and increased
increased future revenues, but under a Forego
strategy those benefits
benefits never materialize. Only alterations to the players'
players'
strategy
expected payoffs, and commitment
commitment by the players'
players' to actions that will deliver
expected
general)
increase the likelihood
likelihood of PO (and humanity in general)
such payoffs, will increase
reaping the benefits of the License strategy.
of
How might the players'
players' payoffs be altered? First, D's likelihood and cost of
increase would be for
detection must be increased. One approach to such an increase
by
PO to commit to funding detection activities to be carried out on the ground by
WC. PO is probably better positioned to provide the resources to bolster the
investigatory
we controls the investigatory
investigatory apparatus and
investigatory apparatus, but WC
WC's
knows the local players. Deployment
Deployment of the resources is better left in WC's
hands. As a further incentive to actively detect, the royalty rate owed by WC
of
and/or its licensee to PO could be on a sliding scale and tied to the level of
diversionary activity. The lower the amount of diversion, the smaller the

best choice, regardless
107
the player's best
is one that isis always the
107 A strictly dominant strategy is
note
101, at II;
11; KREPS, supra note
See BAIRD,
BAIRD, supra note 101,
of
strategy choice. See
of the other player's strategy
99,
99, at 26.
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royalty that WC or the licensee would owe to PO. The combination
cheaper
combination of cheaper
detection (because
(because of direct funding by PO) and cheaper
cheaper licensing (because of
of
the lower royalty rate tied to reduced
reduced diversion)
diversion) can increase
increase WC's incentive
incentive to
choose a License strategy.
A second approach
approach to altering the player's payoffs would be to reduce the
cost of local innovation
innovation and increase the benefit for local innovation, from
WC's perspective.
perspective. Direct investment by PO is one clear way of reducing
WC's outlays for adaptive
adaptive R&D, thus reducing the cost of the License strategy.
Increasing incentives
Increasing
incentives to License can
can also be accomplished by enhancing
enhancing WC's
WC's
gain from licensing. Allowing
Allowing WC to participate
participate in PO's worldwide
worldwide gains
gains
locally-developed know-how might achieve such an
from exploitation
exploitation of locally-developed
commitment by PO
enhancement. Importantly, both PO and WC gain from a commitment
PO
never
to partner with WC in pursuing local innovation, because if License is never
chosen, and local innovation never occurs,
occurs, PO misses out on long term revenue
opportunities.
A third approach to payoff alteration involves
involves increasing the opportunity
cost of D's decision to Divert. Again, direct investment by PO can playa
play a role.
providing handsome benefits for
PO may invest directly in local distributors, providing
local firms who respect the supply chain, and exacting penalties
penalties or terminating
relationships when breaches are detected. Similarly,
Similarly, PO may elect to share a
small portion of its gains from local innovation
innovation with D, subject to supply chain
integrity maintenance. The upshot of such an approach
profitable
approach is to make it profitable
for D
D to allow
allow the product
product to reach its intended destination, and very
very expensive
expensive
to deviate from PO's and WC's access goals. Creating
Creating a lucrative and
legitimate role for D
D gives D
D something to lose in choosing Divert.
legitimate
Figure C
Figure

WC

License
Forego

D
Refrain
12,3,
12, 3, 106
3, 0, 100
3,0,100

Divert
5, 0, 86
5,0,86
2, 0, 80
2,0,80

A goal for the local market might be the payoff
payoff set depicted
A
depicted in Figure C
above. In this scheme, a (License,
combination leads to WC earning
earning
(License, Refrain) combination
current revenues of 10, as before, but having distribution
absorbed by
distribution costs absorbed
PO, gaining 4 from stabilization,
stabilization, and receiving 1/3
113 of PO's local innovation
innovation
gain of 3.
D receives legitimate
3.
WC's payoff is thus 10-3+4+1=12.
10-3+4+1=12.
distribution revenue
revenue of 2, and a local innovation
innovation gain equal to WC's, for a total
payoff of 3.
3. In the event of a Divert decision by 0,
D, the penalties imposed
imposed by
by
PO erase any payofffor
payoff for D and reduce WC's payoff by doubling its royalty rate
and eliminating its innovation
innovation gain share. As we assume diversion also
also
eliminates WC's stabilization
stabilization gain, WC's payoff
payoff drops to 10-6=4, in the event
event
of a (License,
(License, Divert) combination.
combination. In any scenario where
where WC Foregoes, we
assume that its payoffs are unchanged
unchanged from the former iteration. D's payoff is
assumed to always fall to 0 if it chooses
chooses Divert.
Although Figure C points us in the direction
direction of a pro-access
pro-access result that
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benefits PO,
PO, WC,
WC, D,
D, and
and WC's citizens,
citizens, achieving
achieving this result will be more
more
benefits
difficult than
than the normal
normal form
form model indicates.
indicates. The
The interactions
interactions among
among these
these
difficult
08
Such
players will
will be
be dynamic
dynamic and iterative.
iterative. I08
Such interactions
interactions are often
often modeled
modeled
players
09
I09
extensive form
form games.1
games.
Such a model is beyond the scope of this
this
Such
using extensive
Article, and
and further research
research is needed
needed in order
order to define the precise
precise form
form that
that
Article,
the players'
players' interactions
interactions would
would take
take in such
such a game. Future work on these
these
the
could also go farther
farther in positing the
the precise
precise license
license terms that
that would
would
issues could
create the
the final
final alignment
incentives represented
represented by
by Figure
Figure C.
alignment of incentives
create
MOVING FORWARD
FORWARD ON ACCESS
ACCESS
VI. MOVING

This Article
Article has explored
explored an alternative
common thinking regarding
regarding
alternative to common
compulsory
traditional all-or-nothing,
all-or-nothing, zero-sum
zero-sum conception
conception of
of
compulsory licensing. In a traditional
compulsory licensing, the parties
parties have little
little incentive
incentive to engage
engage in
patents and compulsory
strategies
increase access
access to medicines for ordinary
ordinary people. Patent owners
strategies that increase
assume, rationally,
rationally, that some
some parties
parties are prepared to divert their product
product from
from
income markets. They pressure their governments
governments
low income markets to high income
governments of countries
countries that might otherwise
otherwise be interested
interested in
to pressure the governments
licenses. Fearing
Fearing retaliation,
retaliation, potential Waiver countries
countries do
do
compulsory licenses.
issuing compulsory
issue licenses because
because all of the distributors'
distributors' incentives
incentives point
point toward a
not issue
products to the gray
gray market. Rather than incur
incur the trade
decision to divert products
countries, Waiver
Waiver country
country governments
governments choose the accessaccesswrath of developed countries,
limiting strategy
compulsory licensing.
licensing.
limiting
strategy of foregoing compulsory
What is needed is a view of compulsory
compulsory licensing
licensing that gives multiple
multiple actors
What
medicines and a
know-how regarding the medicines
development of local know-how
a stake in the development
supply chain.
strong economic interest in protecting the integrity of the supply
Investment by patent owners (and their governments) in the local innovation
innovation
Investment
infrastructures and anti-diversion apparatuses
apparatuses of countries interested
interested in
infrastructures
utilizing the Waiver could go a long way toward decreasing
of
decreasing the cost of
licensing and increasing the gains from such a strategy. Local players have the
the
ground-level knowledge to greatly enhance
enhance the value of the patent owner's
owner's
ground-level
to
asset. The patent owner actually has the resources to put that knowledge to
use. By emphasizing
relationship (with
(with repeatable wins and losses
losses
emphasizing a long term relationship
for countries,
countries, their licensees,
licensees, and distributors,
distributors, depending on their level of
of
cooperation), and by being willing to share gains from innovation (which on a
cooperation),
percentage basis would probably
probably have a significant
significant impact on local player
old
payoffs), patent owners can help move the access debate away from old
thinking.
The co-op licensing model discussed
discussed here is influenced by the scholarly and
popular movement
movement in intellectual
intellectual property away from an absolute property
inventor's
rights paradigm, concerned
concerned only with some mythic individual inventor's
incentive
innovate and need for a monopoly in order to innovate.
incentive to innovate
Innovation and technology policy can be used to serve both individual goals
Innovation

Anderson, supra note 98, at 33.
e.g., Anderson,
See, e.g.,
See id.
id.

108
108See,

109
'0
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and broader societal
societal goals such as economic
economic development.
development.' I 10
10 User innovation,
local innovation, and collaborative
collaborative innovation, can enhance
enhance the value of a
patent owner's intellectual
intellectual property and improve welfare
welfare for users at the same
time. I I I In fact, successful
deployment of a technology in a given market may
time.III
successful deployment
depend on some form of user innovation or local knowledge.
knowledge.' I 1212 Ultimately,
scheme will work only with local support, investment
investment in
in
the TRIPS access scheme
organic adoption of
development leading
leading to organic
capabilities, and local development
local capabilities,
intellectual property recognition, once more pressing issues of public health,
health,
intellectual
addressed.' I 1313
safety, and welfare are addressed.

110 See generally.
e.g., Peter K. Yu, Building Intellectual Property Coalitions for
1'
generally, e.g.,
ORGANIZATION'S
Development, in IMPLEMENTING
IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION'S
DEVELOPMENT
AGENDA
79 (Jeremy de
Beer ed., 2009),
2009), available at
DEVELOPMENT
http://www.idrc.calopenebooks/454-3/.
http://www.idrc.calopenebooks/454-3/.
III
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
Dreyfuss, TRIPS and Essential Medicines: Must One Size Fit
I See Rochelle
GLOBAL
INCENTIVES FOR GLOBAL
All? Making the WTO Responsive to the Global Health Crisis, in INCENTIVES
51, 58-60
58-60 (Thomas
PUBLIC HEALTH: PATENT
PATENT LAW AND ACCESS
ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDIC[NES
MEDICINES 51,
Rubenstien, eds., forthcoming 2010) available at
Pogge, Matthew Rimmer &
& Kim Rubenstien,
http://papers.ssm.comlso13/papers.cfm?abstracUd=
1443248; Katherine
Katherine J. Strandburg,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1443248;
Evolving Innovation Paradigms and the Global Intellectual Property Regime, 41 CONN.
CONN. L.
REV. 861,871
861, 871 (2009).
12 See
See Strandburg,
Strandburg,supra note III,
111, at 876-78.
112
113 See generally Lanjouw, supra note 12.
113
12.
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